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a 
D\TTHODUCTION 
Relatively speaking , China is still in the pri mary 
stag e of her economi c life. Since the b egining of the 
20th century, t h e authorities in Ch i na h a ve been cont inu-
ously claimi ng such reforms as the industrialization of 
the c ountry , the reorganization of h er financial system, 
and t h e development of t h e nation's transporta t i on and 
c om.muni ca ti on. Such reforms, i n rea lity, can not be 
successfully a chi eved unl ess the nation has a s ound monetc;ry 
s y s tem. Except the revolutiona r y currency reform in 1935 
whi ch temp or arily stabilized China' s foreign exchang e r a te 
and domesti c pric e level until the out break of the S ino-
Japanese 'vvar in 19 37, China has not been able to main-
tain a sound currency system. 
Under the pre s ent chaoti c currency conditi on, fund 
wi ll n ot fl o'\lf onto production c:b ... Emnel and the s p eculation 
in com.ru. odi t y hoarding and in forei gn exchange are un-
a voiabl ei¥ and t h e f light of ca pital abroad is a natural 
result. 
To understand the present monetary condition in Chine:, 
chaotic a s it ' 'rill o e clescri bed later, it is neceasary 
f or one to tra ce h er moneta r y h istory as f a r back a s 1900 
b 
==============~--====-~~====9F==-===-·~ 
The author h op e s t hat this thesis will serve one to this 
end. 
It was the intention of t h is author to ex tend t h e 
scop e of t his t h esis to cove r the monetary histoDy of 
China during tJ.1.e period f r om 1900 up to 19 51. Inadaquac 
of reference material and the un-reliability of s u ch 
inforEJ.ation as to the economic situation after V - J Day 
have prevented this thesis to give more discussion on 
China's monetary problem af ter the y ear 1945. Hm·rever, 
since China 's p ost \var economic life has had no r adical 
improvement, and is still chara cterized by t he \var time 
inflationary s piral , one c an very vlell im.agtne h er economi 
situation a.fter 1945 from \vhat it had been during the 
itrar years, only to modify t hat it has been \·JOrse since 
then. 
The author vli shes to acknovlledge h er sincere grati tu 
to Professor C. P . Huse and Pr ofessor 111 . Delano for "their 
valuable suggest ions in writing this ih esis. 
--==~~- --=--- --- =-=-==-=-=-=--====-=-==-=-=--==--'-'-"'-'" -=-=-=--=--=-=--=-====-=-
Chapte r I 
CURRENCY SYSTEM I N CHI NA PRIOR TO 1928 
A. Lac k of System 
To be exact, there was no mone tary system i n China 
before the establ i sh..men t of the p r esent Nat ional Gove rn-
ment . The currenc y condition . in China was chao t ic; it 
formed the mos t complicated mixture of medium of exchange, 
from the ·weigh t to a coin, that has ever existed in any 
one coun try . 
I t was compose d of a number of sys t ems: t he cash 
coinage; the curren c y of silver bul1ion bas e d on the tae1 
unit; silver coins; t h e foreign coinag e a s well as 
provin cial mi ntage ; and finally there v.;ere t he minor 
silv er co ins , frac t ional parts of the doll ar circu l at ing 
i ndependent l y of t he unit and. with no limi tat ion upon 
their legal tender quality. 
We may r egard the curren cy as on a bimetallic bas i s 
with the coppe r and t he silve r tael a s units . It is 
diffe rent from the real bimetalli sm . 'I'he two metals in 
Ch ina were i ndep endent of each o t her and circulated withou-t 
a fi xed ex change rat io b etween t hem . 'l'he c a sh ,Nas a 
stan d a rd co in; t he tae l an uncoined unit of weight. 
rrrad i t ionally 1, 000 c ash wa s equal to one tse 1, the ratio 
v aried from time t o time . 
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B. Definition of Terms 
I. Cash--A small coppe r or b ronze coin , coneotituting 
t he standard for the everyday t ransaction of the lower-
income group. In the interior it \vas t he principal cur-
rency for the majority of the people . 
II. Copper coins-- Nomin a lly 10-cent pieces , inscribed 
at the min t s as w0rth one-hundredth of a dollar , but 
actually onl:r t oken coins intrinsically worth less than 
h alf of the ir nominal value in their relation t o dollar 
and cash. There were also 20-c ent pieces . 
III. Tael--A unit of \veight of silver of a g iven 
fineness repl"esenting l:he standard for practically all 
banking and co:mmercial operation s. 
IV. Dollar--A 6oin of sever a l makes of different 
weight and finene ss, introduced by forei gners; used by 
t hem as v1ell as post offices e.nd centr a l g overnmen t 
bureaus in everyday 1 s transactions. 
V. Small Coin Silver-- Silver coin ·nomin ally 10 or 
20-cent p ieces, but in reality t oken co i ns v1hose values 
dep end u p on t heir silver con tent . They were coined in 
large quantity at the VB.rious mints. 'I'he ir weight and 
fineness v~rere never cons t ant . One dollar may exchange 
for 2.bout six 20-cent pieces, depending upon supply and 
demand and price of silver . 
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VI. Bi g Money Small Coin--Consisting of 50, 20 and 
10-cent p ieces who s e v a lues are i n decimal prog ression. 
Ten 10-cent pie c es or five 20-cent pie c e s equal one dollar, 
and a c tuall"'T c irculated a t that rate . 'Their silve r fi n e-
ness and c ontent are less than the yu_an dollar. Late r on 
the ;r were deba s ed , a..nd exchang ed at about el even 10-cen t 
p ieces and t en copp er co ins f or one }~an dollar. 
C. Different Currency Systems 
I . Cash 
Copper coins 1rnown as "cash 11 began t o circulat e in 
China about 1100 B . C. They were made of bronze, that is 
a mixture of copper and zinc . They were desc ribed a s 11 a 
ci r cular c oin more ths.n an inch in di8..nete r wi th square 
ho le in t he rr.idcll e f or the convenience of s t r inging . 11 I t 
should c onsist of an al loy of 50 per cen t copper , 41.5 p er 
cen t zin c, 6 uer c en t lead and 2 per c ent tin. Each p iece 
I 
should weigh 3 .78 grams . Howe v er , these s tanclB.rds of com-
p osition an d weight are not free from c ounterf ei t ing 8.nd 
the cash in cj_rcul a t ion would not measure up to them 
g enere.lly . The l a c k of uniformity in weight and size is 
ov1ing t o: (l) Con current circulation of :f:-.he is sues of many 
reigns of the Manchur D:)masty vlith t he surviv a ls of issue s 
of p receding century . (2 ) The crud e me thod of coining 
whi ch rendere d u.niformi ty impo ssible , particul s.rly when 
3 
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the cash min t s v.,e re n o t under t he con t rol and m::mae;emen t 
of one cen t ral au thority . (3) 'l'he circulating of many 
counterfei t coins. 
Ordinari ly, c ash may be con sidered a coin of universa 
acceptabili t y , except in t rade cen t ers 'Nhere i t was the 
only currency . 
II. The Silver Currency 
Silver wa s first introduced a s currency in corn~erce 
during t he paper regime in 1367 . 
The silver unit is the tael. We mus t kn ow that there 
. 
is no coin representing a tael. The tael is actually a 
measure of we i ght. , equivalent t o 1.3 ounces a voirdup ois. 
Thus in a l end whe r e the tael wa s t he measure of v a lue and 
a lso t he measure of v'vei ght, confusion of term is a lmost 
j_nevi table. 
The relation between coppe r and silver currency has 
never b een on a de fin ite fixed ratio. One tael is supp ose<, 
to be equal to 1.50 silver dollar . One silver doll ar is 
8.bout e qual to 1,000 cash or 1,000 cen t s . 
The tael is decimally d ivided in t o mace, c andareen~ 
etc. 'l'hrough lack of government regul ation, the weight of 
tael i s irre gul ar and the puri t y of silver bullion is 
vari able. 'l'hus co1r,verci a l us ages hB.ve corne t o reco gnize 
severa l degr e es of fineness in -the bullion in eve ry 
imp o rtant market . 'l'he v1eightin r-; and testing of t he bullio:r 
t- 1 d · · I no , on y ·waste t.n1e , but a lso had !-he danger of inaccurac~. 
All tae l s of s ilver in Chin a were not of even weight, 
nor of even fin eness. Ou t of t he estimated 170 different 
kinds of t aels, t here were t hree p rincipal taels, namely 
Haikwan tael, Kuping t ael and Shanghai tael. 
Hail-rwan tae l is the tae l with wh:i.ch t he forei g n 
bu s inessmen had most t o do in China , inasmuch a s it was 
the money of account in which al l t he custom dues were 
pa id. Theoretic ally t.his tael is of pure s ilver, 100 per 
cent fine , and t he depository banks for cu stom fund must 
a ccount t o t he government in pure silv e r for a ll the money 
coll e c ted . But i n practice i t is a pur e ly fictitious 
and nonexistant currency. Custom. dues were paid in local 
currency at a re.te fixed on t he opening of t he various 
cus t mnhous e s t hroughout t he cou:n t ry. 
'I'he theore t ci al we i gh t of t he Hai kwan t ael is not 
'" ascertainable ,Ni th any deg ree of certainty. .~..he t reaty 
with Bri tain in 1858 p rovided t hat 583.3 grains being 
e qual t o a tael . In t he same year a t reaty c oncluded 
wi th Fr Emce establi she d the t.ae l at 583.11. In a .ctua l 
estimate of the silve r turned over for a Haikwan tae l the 
v a ri ation was from 581 t o 589 . 
Ku p ing tae l v,ras a lso a fie ti tious g ove rnment money 
of accoun t , formerly used by the government for all dues 
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o the r than cus t om du ·r:i.es , excepting t ho s e whi ch were 
levied in k ind or in coppe r cash. The normal Kup ing tael 
is 575 . 8 grains of silve r and 100 per cent fine . This 
is t he receiving ra t e , whlle t he p aying ra t e is 1.5 grains 
or 0.2 pe r cent lighte r. 
Shanghai tael wa s t he s t andard of internat ional 
exchange for the .t rade in nor thern Ch ina and Yangtze 
valley . The Shanghai tael con tains 524.93 grains of fine-
ness silver. It wa s one of the local taels of t he g reates 
importance in merc an t ile t ransac t ions in Ch ina. 
III. Foreign dollars 
The coastal t r8.de with t he Wes t ern countries brought 
for eign dollars in t o use since the sixteenth century . 
After t he Opium War all the d lfferent k inds of foreign 
coins were decl a red l awful money in Canton. 
'l1he in t roduction of the foreign dollars in to China 
added Bnother element of confusion to t he already com-
plicated currency sys tem . It is stated that t he Portugues 
and Spani a rds brought the dollars into China first. 
Inasmuch as t he tael wa s no t a coin, but a weight, and 
the coppe r coin was t oo bulky for ordinary cash trans-
a ction s, the foreigners found it necessary to introduce 
a medium of exchan g e which was more convenien t t han the 
cumbersome copper c a sh or silver bullion in indefinite 
taels. At the t ime when the forei gn dollars came into 
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China , they ·were the only silver coins in t he count ry, 
and they 8.t onc e bec ame popul2.r . 
The Ca rolus dollar of Spain was the first foreign 
doll ar t o be used in China, and f or a g reat many years 
this dollar circul ated at a pr emium above a ll other 
dollars . I t is said that dur ing Napoleonic War about 
three-fourth s of t he trade of China wa s p aid in Carolus 
dollars . 
Var ious other foreign doll a rs entered China during 
the nineteenth cenh1ry , chiefly of whi ch was the Mexican 
doll ar , which v .:as int roduced into Chin a about 1850-1860. 
In s p i te of t he fact t hat the Mexican dollar was of 416 
g r ains of silver and the Carolus of only 402.5 grains, 
during t he de c a de from 1850-1860 t he Carolus d ollars 
circul ated at a p r emium from 50 t o 80 pe r cent ove r t he 
Mexic an and o ther dollars . 
The forei gn dollars had been circu l ate d in China are 
Carolus dollars ; Peruv i an dollars ; Bolivian dollars; 
Chilean do l lars ; Americ an trade doll ars, 26 . 957 grams , 
900 f ine; Mexic s.n dollars, 27.000 grams , 900 fine; 
Bri t ish trade dollars, 26.957 g r ams , 900 fine; J apanese 
Yen, 26 . 956 gra.ms , 900 fine; and the Ind i an Ru p ee. 
Man y attempts were nade from t i me t o time t o suppress 
t he c i ro.ul at ion of the f o reign coins 1.n China . The Mexica:r• 
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dollars , howe ver, as well as the Hongkong and t he Strait 
dollars, had con tinued to circulate j_n China until 1925. 
IV. Early Chinese Doll a rs 
Before the institution of t he Chinese Republic, 
various forms of p rovincial doll a rs were issued in China 
in v aryin g degr e es of fineness and of d ifferent vveight . 
The earliest Chinese silv e r dollars were issued in t he 
p rovince of Fuk i en and Formosa in abou t 1835, and were 
7 mace, 2 c a.ndareens in weight, and supposedly of pure 
silve r. The ma jori ty of t he provinci al silver coins, 
howe v er , were supp osed to be equal t o seventy-two-hundredt · 
of the Kuping t-ael, 900 fine. 
The first modern mint e stablished in 1887 at Canton, 
n ot a s a part of the na t i onal currency sy s t em , but as a 
provincial under taking for t he convenience of trade. This 
op eration wa s followed by some provinces. Wi thout central 
Government direction, the designs of coins were diff.erent 
and the quality and weight were not uniform, the a.ddi tion 
of t hese p rovin ci a l dollars t o the circulat ion fur t her 
confused the currency condition. 
The Canton min t commenced operat ion in 1 890 . The 
standard coin was fi xed at .70 tael in weight ( t re a sury 
tael ) 900 fine. The fr a ctional part s were of four 
denomina t j_ons, r.. ame ly, 50-cen t- niece, 20-cent, 10-cent and 
5-cent p iece. The 50-cen t was 860 fine, the 20-cent 8 20 
8 
f:i.ne and the 5- cent p iece BOO fine .1 One cent p i e ces were 
a lso minted . Counting in terms of the new silver dollars, 
about three million dollars worth of coins we re issued 
during the first yeHr ; but only a frac tional part of the 
t o tal value was in dollar pieces. Judging from the 
e conomi c a l c ondition in China the dollar p iece was t oo 
l arge for ordinary use. In making n!inor coins, the mints 
gained lo ts of profit . 
The nrovincial dollars never succeeded in d isplacing 
the Mexica.n and o ther f oreign dol lars . As we hav e a lready 
men t ioned, the silve r min t s s oon afte r their establish~ent 
devoted t heir energy t o the c o inage of the fr8 c tional 
silver coins wi th the r esult that the l atter depreciated . 
V. Republi c doll a rs 
During the Republic, five types of Republican dollars 
had been put :i.nto use . The fir st of these bears t he 
p ortra i t of Dr . Sun-Yat- Sen and ·wer e issued by the mint 
in Nanking . The Li- Yung- Hung dollar was . the next coined 
at \Vu ch::mg mint . The t -r- ird of these coins contained the 
portrait of l at.e president Yuan- Sh:i.h-Ka i and was first 
c oined at Tientsin mint in December 1914. Late r, doll a rs 
bearlng the effigy of Li - Yung- Hung were also issued from 
the Tients i n mint . 
1 Wei. Curr ency Problem in China , pp 52 to 55. 
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According t o T.he curr ency regulat ion of 1914,, t he uni I 
of t:he Chine se curr ency vias t o be t he Yuan (or dollar), anc' 
it was of 72 candare en g ross vveight , 90 pe r cent fine. 
Before t he currency r egul at ions were p romulgated, however , 
as the nat ional coinage lav; , t he fineness wa s reduced t o 
89 pe r cent pure silve r, each dollar to be 72 c andareens. 
The maximum v a riation in we i gh t snd fin eness e.l lowed :, 
lmder thi s law, wa s three one- t hous 2nd t hs and coins showin : 
greate r variation in we i gh t and fineness were to be 
reminted . All mint s were sup p o sed t o s t rictly observe 
t his l aw . 
From December, 1914;, when t he Yan dollar began to 
be minted, un t il March 1920 , 383 ,902,948 dollars were 
minted in Ch i na. Mean time forei gn dollars were being 
repl aced to a considerable exten t by the Ch inese dollars 
and the number of Mexic an doll ar s steadil y diminished . 
The rea son for t h6 p opularity of the native coinage lies 
in t he lo1.:v silve r con tent of t he doll a rs; t hey drove 
the b e t t er co in s ou t of circul at ion . 
VI . Subsidi ary coinage 
The doll ar was t oo l arge fo r the majority of t he 
Chinese p eo ple, h ence they h a d t aken re adily to t he u s e 
of the subsidiary ''small money" mainly 10 and 20-cent 
n :i.eces . The m:i.nt auth or i t ies had had a steady demand for 
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these particular p ieces , and , that , coup led wi t h t he 
incentiv e of larg e coinage profi t f r om these small p i e c e·s, 
inasmuch as the silve r dol lars we re 900 fine while these 
sma ll coins were of 820 fineness or less, c aused the mints 
t o pour out enormous quan t i t ies of small coins t o earn 
tr emendous profit. 
VII . Paper money 
In 1851-1861 t he Government is sued paper money which 
wa s noBin ally redeemabl e , but a c t ually neve r redeemed and 
l a tei' repudi a t ed. With t he exc e pt i on of the firs t year of 
the Republic, 1912-191 3 , when b o th Cen t ral and provincial 
Go ve rnments is sued n ote s , t he issue of paper currenc y 
since 1862 wa. s f o r the first time in t he hand of ba.nks and 
ind ividuals. 'J'here was .· a l so considera ble note currency 
issued by t he banks and money changers curr ent in loc a l 
mark ets , of t his pape r cu rrency , a part of i t was based 
on t he c ash . The cash note was loca l in character. There 
wa s a l so an increasing amount of silver no t es b ased on 
tae l and the dollar s j_ s sued by forei gn b anks circulated 
extensively in commerci a l c enters . 
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Chapter II 
THE PROBLEM. OF CURREN CY REFOillJI 
A. Ini t i a l Niovemen t 
An edict was issued on the 26th of August , 1901 , whic 
was t he first effe c tiv e step in the attem-ot t o improve the 
currency condition of the country . I t ordered the closing 
of t he p rovinci a l mints except tho se at Can ton and Wuchang 
and legali zed the ci r cul ation of the coins issued by the 
two mints on a ccoun t of t.heir uniform weight and finene s s. 
As a matter of fa c t , the edict was not taken seriously and 
the p rovincial mints continued t heir a c t ivi t ies, uniformit; 
of weifSht and fineness V\ere out of question. 
To supuly the insufficiency of c ash in provinces, 
another edict authorized the provinc es a l ong the Yantze 
River and seaboard to coin the ne,Jv copper Yu an . The 
copper coinage was successfully put into circulation. 
This issue :rielded a considerable profit t o the provincial 
Government, but caused hardship to the public on a ccount 
of depreciat ion . 
The steady fall in t he pr ice of g old and silver 
became so serious that it caused .financial crisis, and 
the Government on a ccount of its f oreign , ob ligatiob ·. 
·was t hreatened Vli th bankruptcy. 
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Of course, the effect of the disturbances of t he 
fluctuating exchange- ra t e between gold and silver-using 
coun t ries was worldwide. Fundamental currency reforms in 
many silve r-using coun t ries performed right a f t er 1903, 
such as Philippine , India, Sirun, etc. 
In order t o meet foreign j_ndemni t y and to solve 
domestic financial crisis, caused by shifting foreign 
exch :cmg e r ate , s p ecial co:rnmission was sent to J apan to 
study and investigat e the J a p anese gold-s t andard system 
with t;he view to its introduction into China. The lega-
tions in Europe were instructed t o participate in the 
conf erence and dis cussions which were being carried on by 
t he American and Mexican commissions wi t h t he Europ ean 
Governmen t s . 
A memorial was sent to Empress Dowager by the Chinese 
minl s t er at St . Petersburg, Hu Wei- Te. IVir. Hu suggested 
t he a ccumul a tion of a gold reserve for t he gold s t andard 
sys t em. His p l an can be lis t ed as follows 1 : 
l. Name and wei ght of the coins-- The gold coinage 
uni t should be ca1led 11Yu an 11 in p l a ce of t ael . He re com-
mended t ha_ t t h i s new uni t should have the weight of a 
Mexican dollar . The gold co:tn must be worth so many silve 
coins and -:he coin so many copper ones, each piece having 
its ovm name. 
l wagel, Srinivas R. Chinese Curr ency and Ban k ing , p p 92-9 • 
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2. · The a.rnount to be coin ted would be 800 million 
Yuan , of whi ch 15 per cent should be in g old yuan and 
the rest would be in silver coins. 
3. The withdrawal of t he old coins--'rhe old coinage 
must be stopped immediately and the old coins withdrawn 
gradually. The new silver 1.mi t wa s to be 27.073 grams 
in gross weight and 920 fine, and t he remaining 80 parts 
bein~ t he nation ' s seigior age. On the coinage of 800 
million yuan, the profit would be 64 mil l ion dollars with 
which the government can buj_ld a go l d reserve and pay its 
debts . 
4. Th e capital outla;r-- A currency lo an had t o be 
raised t o introduce the new sys t em. 
5 . The introduction of the new coinage--Government 
disbursement and taxation paid and received in new coin. 
6. To secure public and foreigners ' confidence was 
to d eposi t the borrowed gold among t he various foreign 
banks. .A periodical statement of mint operations mus t be 
prepared and made available to t he foreign ministers at 
Peking, in c onformi ty with the prac tice of t he nations. 
Mr. Hu did not mention abou t mint ratio , he pai d no 
a.tten tion to the relat ionship between market ratio and 
mint ratio . By overlooking t his point , · his nlan was 
fundamentally defe c tive and unworkable. 
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B. Foreign In teres t In ':!:1he . Reform Movement. 
When all coun tries vl8r e adopting the gold standard, 
even SiP.Jn, the only ht.o countries that r emained silver 
standard count:ries were Mexi co and China. Even in t he 
silver-using colon i es and dependencie s of Great Brita in 
and France several c ommissions were Etppointed t o inquire 
in detail in t o the mos t feasible n1anner for reforming the 
currency; and in practic ally all these p l a ces i t was 
arrange d to have the gold exchange s tandard . Me:xico 
proposed t o the Government of the United S~tes to 
arrange for an in t e r national inquiry into the silver 
question. China joined t he re quest. 
In response t o t he request of China and Mexico, a 
Corrmission on In +:.e r national Exchange was cre2_ted by the 
U. s. Government in 1 903 . Thi s Commission included Mr . 
J eremi ah W. Jenks . 
Mr . J enks met the argument t b at silve r should con-
tinue the standard for a vvhi le by the statement that the 
in te rim, b efore t he national currency was pu t on the g old 
basis , there would be a grea t disturbance of business. 
The first effect of such a situation would be t o increase 
the p;old value of silv er because of the necessity t o 
re stric t the fluctua~ion in the gold v a lue of silver 
co ins . Any o t her metho d but t:hat of adopting g ·Jld at once 
Mr . J enk s believe d , would be f ollowed by a peri od of 
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unsettled business condi tions . His p lan t o reform China's 
1 
currency c an be summarized 8.S follows: 
1. The Chinese Imperi al Government p romptly t o take 
effective step s, satisfactory to the ma jc:>rity of the 
Indemnity Treaty Power s , t o establish a general monetary 
system c onsis ting chiefly of silve r coins with a fixed 
gold v a lue. 
2. In t he establishment and man agement Chin a was to 
invi te and employ acceptable forei gn ass is tance. 
3 . I n pursu ance of thi s p lan, the Ch inese Government 
to appoint a for e i gn c omptroller of the currency who shall 
have general charge of the system for China; he to have 
acceptable a ssociate s in cha !'ge of the mint or of such 
work as he may p rescribe. 
4. The comptroller to make mon thly reports in detail 
of the condit ion of the currency, including amount in 
circulation , lo 8.ns, draft s and f oreign credi ts , etc. 
His a ccoun t s, but not t ho se of t he gen era l Government, to 
be open at reasonable times to inspec tion by accredited 
representative s of t he Powers interested in the indemnity, 
p rovided the Chinese Government judg~s t ha t s1wh a p rovisi( n 
would be ·wi se in orcler t o secure confidence in t he sys t em. 
lcommi s sion on International Exchan ge of the U. S .--
Memoranda on A New Monetary Sys t em for China--pp 1-43. 
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5. The Chinese Government to adopt a standard of' 
value. rrhe unit to c onsi st of g rains of go l d and t o be 
vwrth p resumably, approximately , the gold value of a tael , 
or somewhEJ_t more than a Mexican doll a r. Provision to be 
made for the free coinage of sui table pieces , multiples of' 
t l, is un:i. t , 5, 10 and 20, on demand, for a reasonable 
c oinage charge. Eventually some to be coined on Governmen ' 
account. 
6. Ch ina to coin as rapidly as p ossible silver coins 
with an appropriate device , about the size of a Mexican 
dollar, for circul EJ_tion in tb.e coun try . 'l'hese to be main-
t a.ined at par with standard unit at a r a t:i.o of · about 32 
to 1. More to be coined t hereafter, accord ing to needs , 
a s indicated by provisions following. Subsidiary and 
minor coins, silver, nickel and copp er , of suitable weigh t 
and value to be provided . 
7. Both the gold and silver coins t o be receivable 
at par in pa7ment of all obligations due to the Chinese 
Imperial Government in any of the provinces. ~Vl'len such 
obligations have been made in silver , the new coins may 
be t endered inste ad at their coin value . 
B. The Government at its discretion , in c onjunction 
with the viceroys, from time to time to de clare , by p rocla· 
mation , in the various provinces the nevf co ins legal tende , 
for debts incurred after the date fixed in t he proclamatio • 
Previous debts to be paid as contracted. 
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9. For the main t enance of the parity of the silver 
coins, t he Chine se Governement to open credit accounts in 
London and other commercia l centers against vrhich it may 
dr8.W g old bills at a fixed ra t e , somewhat abov e the usual 
banking r ate. 
10. Should it be necessary t o make the lo an for t he 
establishment of a general monetary sys t em with adequate 
exchange funds , i t to be se cu red by sources of revenue 
sufficlent t o yie ld a..11. amoun t which will provide for the 
ne eded i nterest and sinking fund, such revenues t o be 
manage d 1.n a manner satisfactory to the parties interested 
11. The seigniorage profi t from coin age to be k e pt as 
a separate furd. Vilbenever 500,000 tael s shall have been 
a ccumula t ed, i t t o be p laced in a gold dep osit with the 
several fo reign deposi t ories in proport ion t o the drafts 
made u pon ·1-:.h em. mb • J. _J_S p rocess t o be c ontinued till at 
least t aels wor th shall be in ·the gold fund on deposit. 
12. For replen ishlng t .he gold fund after its reductio 
by drafts , the c omptroller t o honour silve r drafts drawn b 
~ 
foreign agents of t.he t re asury in exchGn.g e for g old, at 
ra te s fixed by the comptroll e r. 
13. Provision t o be made for a bank ing; l avv under whic 
ban]:{ no te s k e pt at par wi th the 1 egal +:enc1er cu.rrency may 
be issued by an Imperi a.l bank or by- o the r responsible bnnk 
under t he supervision of t.he comptroller. 
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14. As rap idly as is practi c able the n ew curr e n cy t o 
be i ntroduced in t o the v a rious p r ov inces , t he c omp troller 
makin~ ·use of t h e loc a l governments, bank s , busine ss house , 
and such o t h e r 1::1g en cie s a s a r e best su i ted to t he purp ose. 
15 . Wi th in five y e ars t he new sys t em to b e introduce q 
i nto e.11 t·.he t. r ec' t.Y p orts ::m d ::o.s f 1::1.r a s p os sible e l sewhe re I 
an d 8.11 cus toms du t ies to be col lee ted in t erms of the ne\v 
curr ency a s fast as i t is a do p t e d in ·!~he p r ovinces , end 
provision a lso to be made for t he k eep ing of the t ax 
a c coun t.s under t he new sys t em. 
1 6 . 'l'he new system to be put into effec t when the 
new co ins a re r e ady for circul a tion . 
17. 'I'he c omptrol l er and t he rep re s entatives of t he 
Powe r s t o be auth orized t o r ec orr.mend e c onomi c reforms to 
t he Imneri Rl Gov e rnement. 
The adv an t ages of this new mone tar y su s t em for China 
we re repres e n ted t o b e five - fold . F i r s t of all , it would 
brin g 2bout 8. fi x ed r a t e o f exch :mge , v10ul d e limi n ate t h e 
elemen t of r i sl< and unc e r tainty · from i n ternat ion al commerc , 
and t hus bring abou t a l a r g e inc i' e e.se in the volurne of 
Cb.i ne ' s f ore i gn t r ad e . The fins.nce of t he Gov ernmen t 
wou l d a l s o be more cer tain and less embarra ssing t h an when 
the v a lue of t h e tael vra s fluctu a ting . 'l"h e se c ond 
a dvant age vias t h at during t h e fir s t fou r or five y ears of 
t he i n 1-,roduc tion of t he new currency , Chlna rm uld make a 
p rof i t of e.bou t fif ty mil l ion dolla rs in c o i n age . I t wa s 
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s tat ed tha t becau s e of the l.mcertain ty as regm·ds currency 
foreign cap ita l wa2 fi ghtin g shy of China--except that of 
speculs. t or s an d o t hers who had special schemes. 'l.'herefore 
the t hird advantage wa s th.?,t China would , under t he new 
condi t ions , ob t .a in enough c api-t-:a. l t o develop her r esources 
a t lower r ates of in t erest . No t only would China be able 
t o borrow cheaply , but i t would also be abl e t o make it 
p o ssible thB_ t; some of t he obligation s co·uld b e met by 
loans bearing a lowe r rate of i nterest . A considerable 
saving in interest, sufficient t o pay interest on the new 
lo an for currency proper , wa s s t ated to be the fourth 
advan t age. The last ad van i-: age wa s the me.intenance of the 
value of t he taxe s .coll e c ted. Under the old conditions, 
the gold value of Chinese reven ue kept reducing on account 
of the decline in t he g old v alue of silve r, t hu s rl'aking 
i t increas ingly difficult for China t o meet her foreign 
obligat i ons . 
Al thou gh t h e advan tages of t he gold standard sys t em 
were enumera i-ed in de tail by Profe ssor Jenk s, as a lso the 
method by whi-ch introduction of t he new system was to be 
f acili 1-- a ted, the authorities were certaj_nly n o t ena..-rnoured 
of t he proposal. The Gove rnment hB.d not made u p j_ts mind 
as to what to d o V; j_ th the suggest i on when it received a 
memori a l from Viceroy Ch ang Chih- Tung opposing completely 
t.he g ol d standard pl8n . He po in ted aut the inadvisabilit 
of emp loy ing a foreign c orrptrol1er, the lmp racti r' abi li ty o 
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·, 
t he g old system for China and the benefits of a silver 
s tandard for a new uniform coinage . Some of the objections 
of Viceroy Chang were forceful and others sh owed insuf-
fici ent lmovvledge of currency and finance. 
He argued that t.he off icial ratio b etween silve r and 
g old vms arbitrarily fixed a t. 32 to 1; while t he g old price 
of s ilver fluc t u ated in world markets, so wh en China paid 
her foreign g old obli ,r;;at.i ons she had t o ·follov: the inter-
n at ional price. In case t he g old v a lue of silver declines, 
she had no benefit at. a ll, whi le the foreigners u p on 
entering Chines e boundary could g e t over v a lued s ilver 
profit. Upon t his p oint he misunder s t ood Mr . J enks' p l8n 
a s nn effor t t o fix the g old price of s ilve r, which is 
very d ifficult for most of t he g overnments t o do. 
As t o the employment of an forei gn con1ptroller, he 
opposed v ery p owerfully. He thought it was a step leading 
t o :-.he Powe :r- s 1 j_nterference on Chines.e financial condition. 
A coun t r y , >vhe t.her stron g o r weak , should be independent 
of foreign influence and con t rol. 
Be sides , the p;old- e x chan ge standard ·was not practicablE 
for China. Accord ing t o the v er;r limi ted purchas ing p ower 
an d ·!-he low co st of labor, the d eJ.ly commerci a l transactions 
En1.d vmg e pa-;;m1en t ·were counte d in copper currency . Under 
such cond itions, e ven t he si lver tael was t oo big t o be usee; 
gold coins were definitely beyond a ll prac t ic a l purposes. 
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Mr . Chang f2_vored silver standm'd . The depreci at ion of 
gold c an stimul ate export and discourage impor t , which 
would br i ng a favorable i nterna t ional balan c e for China, 
according t o him. 
To operate a gold exchange s t andard s uccessfully, 
certain policie s must b e followed by t he treasury or cen-
tral b~mk: (1) · the national budget must be balanced, and 
fi a.t money must be avoi ded ; (2 ) export s and import s must 
be kept i n normal hal 8.n c e ; (3 ) the loc a l d iscount rate 
must be so r egul ated as t o conserve p:ol d snd p r event 
.:tnfl a t ion , and yet a ccornmod8_t:e business; (4 ) credit and 
curren c y must be controlled as t o k eep d omesti c prices in 
line wi th foreign prices; (5 ) if fore i gn exchange rates 
t hre aten t o abov e or below the " g old points", the con t rol-
l ing authority mu st B. Cti v e l y buy or sell foreign exclwnge. 
None of t hese requirements for a successful g old 
exchange s t.andard c ould b e fulfilled in China at t hat t ime. 
'I'hese are the reasons: (1) Ever since t he ye8.r of 1 848 , 
China has b een suffering from a series of f or eign wars, 
domest ic conflic t s, and a ccompanied by floods, droughts, 
and p l ague . Huge mili tary expense s and lo ss of regular 
revenue have made her t reasury exhausted . Consequently, 
t hrough the course of t he p ast one hundred yeai'S the 
Gove rnment nev er did get its budg et balanced. (2) Imp orts 
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have been exceeding exports for decades due t o the 
undevel oped economic cond5_ t ions which made China dependent 
upon f oreie;n g oods in l a r ge qu antit i es . (3) 'J'he local d is-
c ount r at e c an only be regula 1~e d through ru1 unified central 
au thority . · But t he Ch :i_ne Government 1 s decree could hardly 
reach e very loc ali ty until as recent as 1928 . (4) As to 
the con t rol of cred i t and curren c y , it wa s further com-
p l i c ated by local p oli t ics. Un derprovin ci a l s e l f -interest , 
min t operations and paper money is sue s could not be k ept in 
harmony with t he national benefit. Since t h e p ri ce level 
might be d iffer ent :i.n each commu nj_ty, i t was impossible io 
keep domesti c price level i n line with f oreign prices . 
(5 ) On the probl em of buy ing or selling f oreign exchange 
if i t s rates threaten t o g o s.b ove o r belo vv t.he gold- p oint s, 
the Government has t .ried without any succ ess . If t he 
foreign t r a de balan c e could not be c onstantl y ma in ta ined, 
the op en m8rket oper·ation c ould only me et buyers 1 needs on 
forei gn draf ts . Few p eople vJOuld bring in go l d remittanc e 
for sale. r his situation , if allowed t. o last lonse r thm 
i t should, would exhaust the g old reserve . 'l'hen the n at ion 
would be forced t o abandon its gold- exchang e standard . 
Thi s wa s exac tly wh at vvould happen in China should t he 
gold exch 8nge standard be adop ted . 
c. New reform n l :=ms of 1905 
Alre 8.dy before t he 8.rriv8l of Professor J enks in China 
i~h e Board of Revenue , l n cooner8tion with ministers of the 
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Financ ial Co:rmniss i on , tried to fi n d a home- made f ormu la , 
on the basis of whi ch China ' s currency sys t em was t o b e 
suc cessful l y remodelled . Su bsequent l y the endeavors of 
the offic ial organ s were p romo t ed by Viceroy Chang Chih-
t ung ' s oppo si t i on t o the nlans o f Professor Jenks . Fur-
t hermore , the provinc es had inaugu rat e a piratic a l money 
ra i s i ng p olicy by f looding the country wi th nevvl y mi n t ed 
copper co in s. Thi s unne c essa.ri l y l arge addition t o t he 
cir cu l a t ion wa s responsibl e f 6 r a c on side r able depreci at ion 
of the copper c en t . The t o tal produc ti on of 10-cash coppe r 
c oin s in 1904 was estimated at 1, 693 ,700 , 000 p i e c e s. 
Durin g the f ol l owi ng year a furth er quanti ty of 
5 , 806 , 30 0 ,00 0 p i e c es we r e minted by 1~.he 1 6 coppe r min ts . 
On Augu st 22 , 1 905 , Inrper i al sanction was g iven t o a 
proposal . r eg Pr ding the refo rm of' China ' s na t ional currency . 
The plans ~hen submi tt.ed c onsisted of ten regulat ions re-
garding the ne wl y r- r opose d c u r ren cy and of eight rul e s 
c on c erning t;he Gove r nment Mint at Ti en t sin. Th e said 
r e gul ations were t he r esul t of deliberations , extending 
ove r t wo years , between the Bo a.rd of Revenu e and a specia lb 
se l e c ted group of dignitaries . 
The ten regul ations c on stitut i n g the memori a l d i d not 
mention the st andard f or the newl y p r opo se d nati onal 
currency . But i n the mint regul at i ons were embo d i ed the 
fo llowing declarations :l 
l 'J'he Currency Probl em i n China , by Wen Pin We i, 1 91 4 . 
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(1) The coinage of the thre e metal s will be knovm as 
the 11 Ta-Ch 1 i~g gold coinage 11 , '' the Ta-ch 1 i ng silv er coinage ', 
d 11 th rp <) - Ch f i . l -' II an e __ ,__ ~ ng copper c o_nage • All three are designed 
f or geners.l c irculation throughout the empire. 
(2 ) 'J'he originsl :ini:;ention in t.he establishment of the 
central mint -vvas t he reform of the currency , by is suing a 
currency in three metals, gold , s ilver and copper, but the 
establi shment of a curr en cy system is a ma t ter of s erious 
importance and ·we c annot avoid a careful investigation to 
determine the prope r weigh t and fineness of the gold and 
si lve r c oins, an d this n roblem has yet t o be considere d 
t horoughly and be de c ided . 11 
Three mon t hs after the a bove memori a l s and r egulations 
hrtd b een published , the Ministers of the Financi al Commissi ' n 
and of the Bo ar·d of Revenue subm:t t ted further and mo re 
definite regul ations . In reje c t ing the proposal f or 
in t roduc j_ng the new sys tern on the gol d standard the 
ministe r s , in the memori a l submi tt ing the new r egul ations, 
decl ared t ha t China's a ccumul ations o f gold were not large 
and that hitherto in b o th public an d private transac tions 
i t ha.d b een customary to us e silv er and copper. Hence they 
s tate d t hat after the si lve r coinage had been successfully 
in t raduced in t o c irculation , then they ·would consider the 
mat t er of a ccumul a t ing bullion for t he mj_n ting of g old 
coins . But defini t-.ely t hey deemed i t unwise t o 8.ccept 
the gold standard at that moment . 
D. ~,he g old- sta..YJ.dard scheme of 1907 
China had been · carefully Vlatch:i.ng developments in the 
g old-currency schemes of India, the Straits , Siam, t he 
Philippine Islands and Mexico. By force of cir cums tances 
she was prevented from following t he example set by those 
coun t ries; bu t the 1..min t entional dele,y taught Ch i na valu-
able lessons. Had she been enabled t o c a rry t he g old-
currency scheme into effect, she would have saved herself 
the cos t and troubl e of modifying the system, as mo st of 
t:hose countries v;rere forced to do. 
The con t inued p ostponement of t.he curr ency-reform 
proje c t caused much disappo:'Lntment among man"'r of the 
Gov e rnment off ici a ls. In the commen cement of 1907 the 
Minis t er t o Great Britian, Wang Ta-hsie, presented a 
mem.orial to t h e throne, suggesting the immedi ate adopt ion 
of the g old-s tandard for China. The memorial, however, 
only c alled forth severe criticism on the part of t he 
Board of Revenue. Making use of that opportunity t he 
Bom~d announced i t s p olicy 'Ni th regard t o its own g old-
currency s cheme , whi ch c an be summarized as follows: 
1'he gold-exchange s tandard was found to be the only f eas ibl 
. . 
system and p os s ible courses with which to a crneve it were 
four. (l) To introduce the uniform n ational coirtage based 
on silver; and subsequently ·:- o give t he silver currency 
a fixed par i ty with gold ; t he course by wh:i.ch Br i t ish India 
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a dopted her g ol d standard. (2 ) To i n t roduce t he silver 
c o in s 8.t a fi xed v a l u e in r-;ol d at t h e v e r y b eg inn:i.n g, and 
t o :r.J.aintain t hem ther (' a f ter at the ir gold val ue ; this being 
the Philipp i ne cur ren cy system. (3 ) •r o introduce t he 
s ~r s tem i n a manner simil o.r t o (3 ); bu t a t t h e s ame t ime 
t o introduce a part i a l n o te ci r c u l a t ion as a subst i t ute 
for t oken s ilver coins. (4) To in troduc e the new 
n at i on a l s ilver co i ns in t h e s ilver bas i s t o r e p l a ce t he 
o l d c oins and bullion curr e n c y . Su b s equen t l y t o ext end 
t.he n o te c i rcu l ation t o repl a ce the new standard co i ns; 
the c oin s s o wi thdrmvn to b e he l d a s a t rus t fund or sold 
f o r g old . \IVh en t he n o +; e c ircu l ation b ecomes universal, 
t o dec l are f o r fr e e c oinage of g old at the market rat io of 
a given time and conve r t the si lve r notes into gold n o t es. 
If the g old r es e rves prove insuf f ic i ent at an y t:i.me, t he 
notes may b e red eemable i n si lver bul lion at i ts mar ke t 
v a lue j_n gol d . The Bo e_rd c ompsred t he se f our c ours e s a nd 
found the four t h pref e r able b ec ause i t c ombin e d the 
adv a..YJ.tages of t h e other s wh ile fre e f rom the o b jec t ions 
again s t them . I n adoptin g thi s c ou r s e the necess a ry s t e p s 
t o take vvou ld be (a ) t o prepare the ne ces sary a dminis t r a tivE 
machine ry , (b ) t o pu t i n t o c i rculat ion the s ilve r c o ins, 
(c) t o repl a ce t he co i ns by subs t i tu ~ing a note circulat ion 
(d ) t o re c oin the shmds.rd p i e c es into subsid i ary c o ins, anc l 
f ine.l ly t o de c lare f or r;old c oin ap:e at the marke t r at io of 
the day and maintain the circulation at that ratio there-
af~e r. '1 h e es sen t i a l thinp; as a prepar at ion , the Board 
declared , would be to p repare a sufficient gol d stoc k , to 
a ccomplish which would require six or seven y e 2.rs of 
strenuous effort . 
Thi s prop os a l indicate s that the Board of Finance wa s 
no l onger c on s tituted of men v7i t hout experienc e and know-
l edge a s had gener8.lly been the c ase in t he past . 'I'he 
c ourse of a c t ion j_t announced a s bes t , h owever, was not 
in t ended to be put j_n t o i mmedia t e effec t.. Cornm en t ing on 
the p olic y t hus outlined , t he Mini s t ers of St at e subsequent y 
decl ared that the reform mus t b e undertaken s tep by step , 
and dwe l t at considerable length u non the d:i.fficul t i es of 
in+;roduc ing this p l811 of reform. but nothing fur t her wa s 
heard abou t t heir scheme , and the Government c ontinu~d i t s 
p olicy of ina c t ion . 
E . Dr . G. Vissering ' s Plan 
Early in 1 911, a c ontrac t wa s signed by the Chinese 
Minis t er of F inance ·wi th an in te rnationa l bs.nkin g g roup . 
Under this c on t r a c t. , 10,000,000 s terl i ng would be gran t ed 
for the pur pose of reforming China's currency s y s i~. em. 
Chin a ag~eed to invi t e Dr . G. Visse r ing , late President 
of t he Javas ch~ Bank t o a ct as monetary advis e r t o the 
Chinese Government under t he terms of t he currency loan 
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agreement. Dr. Vissering's appointment was made just on 
the eve of the Revo lution, which broke out on Octobe r 10, 
1911, 2-.nd brought the Monarc h system to an end . Hence the 
~ 10,000,000 currency has never been raised. Upon the 
Hepublic Government ' s invi tation, Dr . Vissering reassumed 
his work in 1913. He believed that the only feasible 
system for China was the gold-exchange standard. He 
asserted that before ta king any step, the t oken coins must 
be Etccepted at +;heir face V8.lue throughout. the whole 
country; and counterfeiting coin h ad to be absolute ly 
prohibited . Moreover, he favored a gradual evolution 
ins t ead of immediate achievement . 
By the time when Dr. Vissering started to work , the 
curren cy system in China can only be described as chaotic. 
The provinc i a l mints, for inst ance, under t he control of 
v a rious grasping militarists , had b e en minting coins of 
different kinds, of inferior quality , for revenue purposes . 
Consequently the country wa s fl ooded with depreciated 
copp er and silver coins. 'I'he v ariation in weight and 
con t ents of silver dollar produced by different mints nnd b]' 
the same mint s.t different times was just astonishingly 
wide . 'i'here wa s not another country in the world where the 
C1J_rrency was so bewi1de r ing t o the nev,r comer s as that of 
China. One would find on arrival in this country that he 
must pay his ordina.ry bills in dollars, whi ch might be 
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Mexican or Carolus, or provincial doll ars , or the ne·w 
na tional doll ars . He ·would , moreover, find that for 
bookkeeping nurposes one cent was reckoned as one- hundredth 
of a dollR.r, and he might a c tually receive , or have to g iv,e 
1 4:0 copper cen t s for a silver dol1 8.r . For imported g oods 
a...nd :foreign remittances he had to nay Haikwan taels and 
t hese ta.els, which did not exist as coins, had to be pur-
chased i n dollars at v arying rates . Finally, he had to b e 
very c areful in accepting bsnknot.es. Only those issued 
loc a lly were as a rule to be a ccep ted at face v alue . 
'Ihe first s t e p in currency reform as was re cognized 
' in 1911 was the standardj_za t ion of t he silver currenc y . 
Dr . Vis s ering insisted that the dollar mus t be coined in 
technic al sense not a commodity of fluc tuating value; and 
the subsidiar;r coinage both silver and copper must a lso 
be standHI'dized ~md un i.versally a ccepted a t its f a ce value; 
+-hat the tae l unit must be eliminated and a ll payments both 
public an d private must b e made in n ew uni t ; t h at t he silve 
dollar must be o f uniform weight and fineness. 
Currency reform, hmNev er , ought not to end with the 
a doption of a stendard si lver currenc y . The exchange 
medium of +-.he greater part of t he \vorld at t hat t ime was 
gold. The subsidiary si lver , nickl e, and copp er coirs we re 
me:c·e l y token , and the flu c t u ation in the value of silver 
o r copp e r had n o direc t effec t u pon ~he c ommodi ty . The 
fluc t u a t- ion in for e i gn exch ang e is t he chief obstacle in 
in 1~erna t ional t r ade . Expor t ers r egarded exchange 
fluctuati on a s being t he mainly responsible for t heir 
inabili t y t o s ecure orders from a bro ad ; impor t ers had found 
t o t hei r high co s t due t o i·he high p rice of silver, 
a ccompanying by gamblin g j_n exchange , t h at their markets 
were comple+:e l y d emoralized . So Dr. Vi ssering was convincec 
t:h8.t anything apDroaching stabili ty in busines s c an on ly be 
broup;h·l: abou t by the introduc tion of a g old standa rd i n 
Ci·~ ina . And t his , he fur t her indic a ted , like other 
imp or tant r e forms could only be effec ted ·when the n a ti on 
p OS C;e sse s a stable g ove rnment and r egained t he conf indence 
o f t-he forei gn money marke t. 
Dr . Vi sserin ,a,; ' s p l tm for Chi nese curr ency wa s publishe · 
in 1 912 . Bo th t he pure g old standard and t he limping 
s t. andnrd we r e ruled ou t as imprac ti c able under t he existing 
condition . He advoc ate d t he r;old exchan ge system, and 
defined it on t he more or less c omple +- e ap·r; lic 8.tion of a 
s ystem whi ch c ons i sts of th e c ircul ation , within the count~, 
of s ilver t oken currenc y , g overnment currency or banJr..notes. 
Tha t i s , such means of pa·yment have n o t in t hemse lves a 
sufficien t in t r insi c v a lue, or any value at all. Ne verthe-
l es s, t hey ar e ma intained a t a parity with gold , n o t only 
by t he extensiv e ci r culation of gold co in s o r by a l a r g e 
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stock of g old within the country , but a lso by an explicit 
reserve abro ad , on which drafts are made f or t hat purpose . 
He l isted h is pl an as f ol l ows : 
I) . First Period 
1. The very first step mus t be the adopt ion of futur 
go l d unit us fmmdat:lon of the new s y stem, in order t o a voi< 
spe m.:t l ation on the ennounc emen t of the gold par an d a lso to 
a vo id that. the new unit vwuld lB.ter on bav e t o be raised to 
its fu ture nomin a l value . 
2 . The o rm:mizat.ion of a central banl<.: of i ssue. 
3 . Th e in t r o duc tion of the nevr gold unit as money 
account for book credi ts and book tre.n sfem 
4. Se curing the coopera.ti on of the f oreign exchange 
banks and t he private Chinese banli:S for the introduc tion of' 
the new gold uni t int o t heir b ookkeep ing. 
5 . 'J:he j_ssuance of banlmo t es based on t he g old unit. 
6 . 'I'he a ccumul ation of a g old reserve agains t the 
b anlmotes is sued . 
7. The r egu le.t ion of t he man agement of t his g old 
reserve . 
8 . Even tually declaring t he banl-mo tes a. s the l egal 
t ender. 
9 . '~' o make a clo se study of t he c onditions of t he 
bal ance of trade, and the balanc e payment of China . 
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II} . Se cond Period 
10. 'T'he establishment of weight , fineness and a lloy 
of the token coins and of the new subsidiary coinage . 
11. The issuance of t hese toke~· coins and 
simultaneous ly 
12. 'l'he a ccumul ation of gold reserve agEJ.inst the 
token co ins , and the regulation of i ts manageni.ent. 
13. If desirable, the c oinage and the issuance of 
gold co ins . Al so , if desirable, the temporary admission 
of particular .foreign gold co ins as l egal tender, and the 
temp orary issuance of g old certificates. 
14. 'l'he proclamation of unl imi ted legal tende r of 
(a ) the silver token co ins of 1 and 2 units; (b) the above 
ment ioned gold s and eventually the gold certif icates . 
III) • Third Period 
15. 'l'he gradual withdrawal and demoneti z ation of 
the old silver coins, a s far as necessary of the old system, 
2nd of t he present cash. 
Dr . Vissering pointed out th at this system was particu-
larly suited to a coun~ry accus tomed t o the use of silver, 
where an a c tual go l d coin was not needed vvhi le the gold 
required to maintain the Darity of the silver coins would 
amount to a f a r smaller quantity than would be necessary 
if gold coins we re in actual circulation . 
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Little had been done about Dr . Visserine; ' s plan; the 
bad and v orsening currency condition in China was still 
lef t untouched. 
'l'here v1e re differences between Dr . Vis s e ring 1 s p lan 
and Professor Jenks' plan. Professor Jenks strong l y urged 
the a.doption of t he gold exchan ge standard from the begin-
ning in order to nvoid the disturbances of business that 
would come from t-.he introduc tion of the s ta...ndard silver 
coins snd bullion value , and their subsequent increase in 
value by 20 to 30 ner cent when t he gold basis vm s adopted. 
Dr . Vissering , on the other band , urges the advis ability, 
during the in t roductory p eriod, of having a go ld exchange 
s +:.and 8_rc1 as far as possible nnd a lso at t he same time a 
silver standard. He estimated i t would take a numbe r 'of 
years before the new currency would be the only one used. 
Meantime, the silver standard would be used c oncurrently. 
F. National Currency Regulation in 1914 and 1 915 
The pr6vinci2.l . min t s , under t he Republic Govef'!1ment, 
followed pretty much t he traditional method to earn profit 
-t-hrough debased coinage . This meti2 od resulted in 
depreciated curr ency. In order to corre c t such mistake , 
National Currency Regulationsl were passed in Ja.nuary , 
1 91 4 . The followin g are their es s ence: 
lchin a Ye8r Book , 1924 . 
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Art. 1. '.!.'he right o f minting and is suance of n at ional 
curren cy shall b e long solely t o the Gov e rnment. 
Art . 2 . 'I'he unit of the national coin shall b e called 
Yuan , ond t he yuan shall con tain six ma ce , four c andare ens 
and eight LI (K'upin g V'.reight) o r 23 .978 gramme s of pure 
silve r. 
Art . 3 . The d iffe ren t kinds of n ational coins are : 
(A) Silver co ins--1 yuan , 1 /2 yuan , 20 cents p iece, 2.nd 10 
cents p iece; (B) Nicke l coin-- 5 c en t p iece; (C) Copper 
coin s-- 2 c ent , 1 cen t , 5 li, 2 li, 1 li. 
Art . 4 . The v a lue _of the nat ional co in shall .be in 
d e c imal progress ion. 
Art . 5 . The we i ght an d fineness of t he coins s hall 
be as follo ws: (A) 1 Yuan-- gr os s v..reight 72 candareens 
wi th 90 pe r cen t si l v e r and 10 per cen t cop per; (B) 50 .cent -
gross we i ght 32 . 4 C811dareens with 70 per cen t silver and 30 
pe r cen t copner ; (C) 5 cen t -- gross weight 7 c and a reens ·with 
2 5 pe r c ent n ickel and 75 ner c ent copper; (D) 5 li copper 
piece-- g ro ss v,reight 9 c andareens with fineness as 95 
per cen t copper e.nd 4 per cent p ewter e_nd 1 pe r cent le a d; 
••• e t c. 
Art . 6 . One yuan p iece shall be of 1m limi ted legal 
tender qu a li ty ; for 50 c en t p ieces the l egal p ower t m der 
only u p t o 20 yuans; f or 20 cen t p ieces up t o 5 yuens . 
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Art . 7. The de s i gns of t he national coins shall be 
proFulgated by a Provisional Order. 
Art. 8 . The ratio of t he difference between t he 
wei ght of silver coins and t hat of t he legal t ender shall 
no t exceed 3/1000. The r8_tio of t he difference bet·ween 
the t.ot·al vieight of per 1000 p ieces of the silver coins nnd 
t he legal weight of that a.mount of coins shall not exceed 
3/10000. 
Art. 9 . The ratio of the difference between the 
fineness of any pie ce of s ilve r coins and the legal fine -
ness shall n o t exceed 3/1000. 
The law of the different nations on the subject of 
banking P.nd t he issue of no t es v a ry con s i derably. The 
privile ~ e of extraterritorali ty enj oy ed by foreign banks 
a dded fur t her complicat ion t o the Chinese currency system. 
rphe regul a t.ions restri cting the is sue of paper money 
a s of October, 1915, whi t:"h appear be low, were the first 
offici a l steps wi th regard to paper money issuing . 
Art. I. With t he excepti on of the Bank of China an 
official and priv2.te banks and exchange houses , etc. must 
comply with these regulations. All printed and wri t ten 
notes of ·whatever emount b earing no nrune of the p e:rson 
payable nor the date of paym.en t , or any no t e which c a n be 
exchanged for taels, dollars or subsidiary coins when 
presented for payment , shall be regulated as paper money. 
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Art . II. After promulgation of these regulations, 
all banks and exchange h ou s es whi ch sha ll be est ablished 
8.nd all t r o se which hav e no pEtper money in t he m8rket shall 
n o t be a llowe d to issue no t e here a f ter . 
Art . III. In c2.se where before t he promulgat ion of 
i-hese r egul a tions spec i Bl permission ha s been g r an t ed 
t o any bank or exchang e house by t he Government to issue 
pap er money , i t sh all be a llowe d t o continue t o i ssue the 
s arre , but a_s soon a s t he n eriod of li cense exp ired s.ll its 
p8pe r woney should be wi t hdrawn fr om the market. Wi th 
reg a rd t o t hose b anks , which ob tai ned no speci a l p er-
mi ssion from t he Government , the amoun t of their pape r 
money in the rn.arke t shal l n o t exc eed t he a v e rage amount 
of t .he last three month s b efore the promulgntion of thes e 
regula t ions , ..:md no more notes sha ll be i ssued . At the 
same time t he Ministry of Fin ance shall fix a da t e for 
t hem t o rec all a ll the ir not e s f rom t h e market . 
Art . IV. Wh.en a ban k issue s no t e s a ccord ing t o the 
p r ovisions nade in Art . III, i t should hav e at l e as t 50 p er 
cent money as reserve, and the o ther 50 pe r cent may be in 
domestic lo ans , bonds or other c ornmerci al bonc1s a s a 
security for the rest of the res e rve fund s . Sh ould the re 
be s p eci a l ci r cumstanc es requiring a de vi ation from the 
a bove rule, a petiti on should b e sent t o t he lVUni s t ry of 
F inance f or de ci sion . 
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Art. V. All bsnk s issuing no t es should submit monthly 
statements on the s.mount of their notes in the market a nd 
the e..rr.ount of' reserve fund s , to the Ministry of Finance 
or t o the hi ghest loc a l officials to be transmi t ted to the 
s a id Min:tstry. 
Art. VI. The Ivilnist. r~r of Finance may app oint officials 
or j_n t e re st an y public org an t o institute investiga tions on 
the e.moun t of not e s issued , t he ready monev as reserve fu..ndf'_, 
securi t ies , and all o t her documen t s ~f t he " note issue b~mks I 
Art . VII. Any bank or exchang e hous e viol a ting the 
Drovisions ma de :i..n Art II- IV shall be fined snv s um from 
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~~500 to ~ 5,00 0 ~Cmd h a v e i t s right t o is sue notes c anceled. 
Art . VIII. Any bank viol a.t ing t h e u rovision made in 
Art. V, t hat is, fail ine; to submit a monthly r eport or 
submi t.ting a fa l se one, shall be fined a s um between $ 50 to 
$ 500 ; and a b snk r e fusing to be investigated as p rovided 
for in Ar t . VI. sha l l be fined a sum between ~~100 to 
~?1 ' 000. 
Art . IX. These regulations shall come i nto effect 
from the d ate of their p romul g ati on . 
G. Chine s e Banking Group and Currency Reform - 1921 
The Chinese b anking group , submi t ted on Oc t ober s·, 
1921, a number of memorand a t o the Government , among whi ch 
wa s the fo1lovring on monet a ry r e form : 1 
1Lee, F. E . and F in8.nce in China--
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1. Gold should be adopted a s the basis of Chjnese 
mone t ary currency . As the fir st s tep t.ovvard the i~1tro­
duc t ion of gold standard , ac t ion is t o be t a ken to re-
Hd just the v alue of a.ll silver doll ars as well as a ll 
subsidiary coins both in silve r and copp er . 
2. The use of tae l should b e aboli shed . 'J'he fine -
ness of the _le gal tender should be properly defined so 
that silver dollars may s erv e as t he sole Chinese medium 
of exchang e and also find a p l a c e in the rJa r ke t quotat ion 
o f t·he in ternation a l curr en cy . Al l t he mints in the 
countr::r , V'!h e t her t hey are already in exi stence or are 
to be establi shed , should be p l a ced under a unified 
syst.em of man 8.R81:1ent so tha t all t he silver d oll a rs in 
circula t ion throup;hout the coun try may have e. uniform 
finene ss and legal standard . Moreover , silve r dol lars 
may be supDlied for the extent of circulation . 
3 . Ev e ry res t ri c i·ion shall be i mpo sed on t he 
min t ing of old subsidiary coins , both in silver and 
in copper , proper steps should also be taken t o wi thdraw 
all the old sub sid i ary c oins i n circul at ion from the 
marke t, in p l a ce of wh ich nev.r ones either in silver or 
coppe r shou.ld be minted s o t hat a de c imal sys t em of' co i ns 
may be maintained. 
4 . The profi t s reali zed f rom ;-,he mintinp; of' new 
sub s idiary coins should be deposited in a sinking f'und 
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whi ch would be solely used in the in t roduc tion of e_n 
uniform s ilve r currency an d in the adopt ion of g old 
st.Bndard . By the e s tP..blishmen t o f such fund, the rais ing 
Of l 2rge lo an mcJ.Y be avoided. 
5. The naner currencv thr01whou t the country should 
be reformed so t hat it. becomes un iform. 
6 . Wi th a view to preventing obstruction in the 
i ntroduction of a uni f o rm pB.per currency , prop osals shovld 
be ma de t o stop t h e foreign banks from issuing notes. 
7. As i·he no t e issue jn for eign currency made by the 
for ej_gn banks in Crd.ne se te r r i t ory infringes Chin a 1 s 
s overign ri~h ts, strong e.c t:i. on should be t.Gken to have 
such note issued stopped at once. 
At the fif th Annual Conference of t he Chines e 
Bank ers ' Associatioh held in Peking in April, 1 924 , 
resolu t ions were a~a in passed wi th the currency si t u at ion. 
Th e probl em of t he fin eness of the Yu a n doll a r, de p re ci at ed 
co ins , t he lack of uniform con +-rol over t he v 2.rious mints 
of the coun t ry, the floodin g of t he coun t·.ry wi t h 
depreciated copper coins, t he completion an d the 
o p erat ion of t he Shangha:i_ min t , t he me a sure s for 
effe c t ing a uniform curr ency , were discu s sed at great 
length and resolu t ions pa ssed in connec t ion with t hes e 
problems. 
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All t hese currency reform movements discussed so f a r 
hnppened b efore the es tablishment of the Centra l Government 
of 'I'he Republi c of China in 1928. 
It shoul d be borne in mi.nd t hat even since the le_st 
ye8_rs of t he Manchur Dynasty, China had be en governed by a 
ntJ_mb e r of "'arlords and loc 8_l author i t ies who simply 
neg1ec t ed or los t the de cree of the Cen t ral Government. 
Fo1lo\'.ri ng t.he col1apse of the Manchur monarch in 1911, 
the new Gov e rnment had a ctua l poli t ic a l con t rol of only 
a few provinces in the Nor thern part of China. The com-
p licated currency sys tem was becoming more corl".plic ated 
wi t h each warlord issuing th~ir new curr ency e i t her in 
note s or in coins or both. Any discussion of reforming 
China 1 s currenc~r sys t.em dur1ng tha t period could only be 
reg a rded a s a c ademic. Even vvi th::i.n those p rovinces under 
the CentrAl Government reform was purely impossible as 
indicated in +he preceeding paragranhs. 
4: 1 
Chapter III 
S I LVER CURRENCY I N CHINA 
The fir st step in unification and control of the 
currency sys t em ·was taken in 1 928 , when the Central Bank 
of China , first foun d ed at Canton in 1924 and later at 
Hankm'l in 1926, was reorga._nized and o f ficia.lly inaugurated 
on November of the same year . At the same t ime, two 
semi-governmenta l ba.nk s, the Bank of China and t he Bank 
of Communica t ion were :respectively charged in t o a specially 
chartered b ank for foreign exchang e and a s p eci a lly 
chartered bank for indus t rial development. The Centra l 
BP..nk of China , as a full- p ledged Government bank with a 
c ap ital of CN ~~20,000,000 vms g iven t he i mportant functions 
to unify currency, to con solidate t he bankin g system, and 
t o main tain s t abili ty in the dome s t ic fj_n8nc i al si tuation. 
In 1929 , fur t her s tep s we re i·aken toward currency reform 
when t he Government invi t ed Dr. E . W. Ke:i:mnerer to head a 
commissi on of American financi al exnerts t o s+udy the cur-
ren c y and fin anci a l problems of t he country and t o make 
re cow.menda.tions on t h e chie f phases of financia.l policy and 
adm i nis tration, i ncluding monet pry re f or~~ re venue pol icy , 
budg et, a cc o·un ting c ontrol, and t he restoration of t he 
n at ional credit. These recomrnenda t ions were embodied in 
a series of reports, o f vihi ch the bes t known is t h a t on 
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currency reform entitled nProject of Law for the Gradual 
Introduction of A Gold Standard Currency System :tn China, 
Together with a Re-oort in Su ppor't 'l'hereof 11 , vvhich ·wa s 
nres nted t o the Minister of I<"in ance under the date of 
Novembe r 11, 1929 . Thi s pro j e c t envisaged two main aims, 
namely, t .he replacement o f Ch5.na 1 s confuse d currencies 
by one uniform and n a tion-vride system and the gra.dual 
in troduc t ion of go ld standard, precludes many subsequent 
T'eforms largely in Pro fess or Kemme rer' s recommendations. 
Thus , on Iviar ch 8 , 1 9?53 , t he standard dol l ar coin age law, 
p roviding that the yuan should hav e a gross vveight of 
26 . 6971 gra.ms of silver 880 fine and +·b us containing 
23 . 493448 grams of silver , was promul gated by t he Govern-
men t as a prelimJ..nary step toward the aboli t i on of the tael 
whi ch had cea s ed t o serv e an y useful purpose , and vvhose 
con t inuati on as a matter of habit ha.d become a s our ce of 
co:mpli c ation and needle_ss c onfusion and expense t o t he 
public. The abol i t i on, which ms an n ounced on March 1, 
1 933 , was officially sanction ed in an order from the 
Minister of Finance, whi ch provided t h at "on an d a fter 
Apri l 6 , 1 933 , a ll pu b lic and priva t e financial trl'l.ns -
a c tions v.rere to bemade in terms of silver dollars and 
t · t 1" f . · · th t · • b · no u 1n .. ae , 1x1ng Hl , e mean ,1me , ,. _e conver s1 on 
rat io of one hund~ed of s ilver doll ars t o 71.5 taels. 
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A. 
For similar objects, the Central Mint started operation on 
March 1 ~s the only institution for the coinage of silver 
dolle_rs, whi ch by the end of the year had already put up a 
t o tal of CN $150 million new currency. 
The Basis and Fun ction of rrhe Silver Standard 
A silver standard is a system of money whereas the 
unit of value consists bf the value of the f i xed quantity 
of s ilver in a free -silver market. Broadly speaking, it 
is a system of mone;r in wh:ich not only :ts silver t he legal 
standard of val ue , but a lso the domestic supply of money 
:ls directly and ultimately related t o the supnly of silver. 
All legal provisions and arrangement for t he redemption of 
currencies into silve r in coin or bullion, for the f ree and 
unl imited coinage of silvAr , for the unrestricted export 
and import of silver, and for the defin:lte reserve ratio 
against note is sues, s.re merely cus t omary accompaniment 
of the silver standard and useful devices f o r :mai ntain1ng 
it . 
'I'he exchange between s1lve r and go l d coun tries 1s 
de termined by the fluctuations in the demand and supply 
of forei gn currencies at f1xed po1nt of t1me and by the 
mark et par of exchange reflecting t he gold pr1ce of 
silver . Change in t he price of silver w111 normally be 
exuected to be re f lected 1n correspond1ng changes in the 
rate of s1lver exchange. Being prac~ically the only 
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important c ountry in the si lver standard, China's net 
bal an ce of ::oa:vmen +:.s tended to e x ercis e the marginal demand 
for s ilve r an d d e te r min e t he ::orice at whi ch buye rs must 
pay for the metal. The norms.l price of s ilver should be a 
man i f es tati on of t he un derlyin g exchange equil ibrium 
bei-ween Chin a and f oreign c oun t r i es . Sometimes , the price 
of sil v e r was determ i ned by t h e appropr i ate exchange v a lue 
of the Ch Jnese currency , rather than vice v ersa, s o t hat 
i t +:. ends , fir st. , t o ef f e c t the s t ate of equi librium be tween 
Chinese price and j_ntern a t ional prices, and secondly , to 
enable CbLw to have just enough balan ce of payments to 
absorb t he amount of th e surnlus silve r sup~ly offered 
at t he r ate she determined . 
As a result of the i nter - a c tions of these t wo 
pri n c ipal fa c t or s a f f ec t ing t be rate of silve r exchange, 
their net e f fe c ts t end t o be i ntensi f ied or mi ti~~t~d 
a ccordingly as they operate in t he s ame or in the opp osite 
direc tion . I t is obvious that a rise or fall in silver 
exch e.rige will be a ccelerated and longer sus tained when a 
rise in i·he price of s ilver is a ccompanied by a favorable 
balance of in t e r nat-ion al paymen ts , or a. fall by an adverse 
bal ance. Conversel;r , the silver exchange will not rise a:s 
rapidl~r or t o t;he s mne ox tent a.s does the price of s ilver 
when t he balance of payments is adversed , nor fall t o a 
lik e exten t when the b a l a.nce of payments is f avorabl e. 
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The fluc tuai~ i on of t he silve r exchang e represents, therefore, 
two sets of influences at work : therela t ive strength of t he 
recip roc e. l d emand for Chine Pe as a p;B. in st foreign currencies 
which is d e te rmined by the balanc e of international payment.; 
and the market par of exch an ge as dete r-mined by the p rice 
Of sl·lve r·· . 'l1he l · t h f ·1 1· · t d c 1.ang e ln e ormer are neces :::-arl y lml e 
by the spe cie points since the mo v em.ent of g old or silver 
a lway s provide an a l te r ns_tive medium of remi ttances f or the 
s e ttl emen t of in t erna t ion a l a c coun ts. ~ 1he change in t he 
market par , on t he othe r hand , depend entirely on the 
nr ice of s ilve r. IJ'he gold p rice of si lver might change 
qui t e i rresnective of China 's and even much a gB.ins t her 
will, and her exchange is sacrifice d as a.n inno cent v i c t im 
o f t l:e silver market . 'l'he movements of t he ·silver exchange 
are , therefo r e , cha rac ter i zed by the map.:nitude of i t s 
fluc t ua t ion s and by t he irregularity and suddenne ss 'Ni th 
which t he s e fluctu a tions occur. 
These sudden and i r regul ar mo v ements a re fr aught with 
serious and disturb i ng con sequenc es t .o the domes t ic economy 
In t h e first p lace, t hese fluc t ua t ions require ins t ant 
R. d j usi~ment in the dome s t ic price and i n c ome struc t ure and 
·when the p res sure is from f orces i mp ing i ng from wi thou t 
and ·when e_ r enewed r eadjus T.ment is required b efore i t is 
compl eted, the pro ce s s of adj u stment is made especially 
difficul t and painful . Moreover t he erratic exchang e 
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movement an d their attendant exchan.g e r:tsk tend to prevent 
anv inflow of short term fund, which are gen e rally availabl( 
unde r stable exchange to cover a temporary defici t in the 
i n +-.erna tional balance , with the c onsequence that whether 
t he in·l-.ernaU.onal di sequilibrium be temporary Ol" permanent, 
+·.he domestic price and income struc t ul"e have to be a r t he 
whole brunt ad justment . Apart from the fre quency and 
rapidity Vl i th whi ch the proces s of ad jus t men t is necessitate<· 
by the fluctuation in t.he~ice of s ilver, t he adherence to 
t he silver stand a rd tends to exaggera t e t he extent of 
ad justment required, once t he internat ional equilibrium is 
disturbed . While be tween the g old standard coun t rie s , 
t he mo v emen t of g old bullion, if unneu tralized b y op en-
market operations, n ormally b e expected t o produce a 
rising pr ice level in the coun t ries receivi n p:: gold and 
a fe.llin~ level in a countr y l osing i t , t hereby t he 
disequilibrium is corr ec te d by some ad jus tmen ts in the one 
and some ad justmen t s :tn the other; under t he silver standarc, 
however , the r ec iprocal effe c t of spe cie f low is ~estroyed 
and rende red comDletely inoperative . An outflow of silver, 
while de cidedly def l a+- ionary t o +-he silve r s t andard country 
does not p roduce the opp o s i t e infl a+- ionary effect in the 
receiving g old standard coun t ries whe re silver is only a 
comn,odi ty . On t he o t her hand, an inflow of silver, while 
infl at i on ary in a coun t r y on silver, does n ot at t he same 
t ime give rise t o any depressing influence in g old s t andard 
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coun tries whence silver come s . Owing t o t he absence of the 
re c iprocal effect in price, the efficacy of snecie flows in 
restoring an j_nternational equillibrium is reduced. Con-
sequently, not only in the mg_gn_j_t ude of specie movements 
required exaggerated, but the process of j_n tern a t ional 
ad jus tment is also retarded. While internationally, the 
adjustment of equilibrium is de l ayed and protra c ted, 
internally the price struc ture j_n a s ilver standard cou..lJ.try 
becomes more independent of and les s sens itive to the 
influence of worl d pri c es . Vlhen the world general pr ic e s 
are falling and wi th them the price of silver, the 
depreciation of s ilver as a monetary standard tends t o 
have inflationary con s equences in a silver-using coun t r y . 
On the o th er hand , when the world general prices are 
ri s ing , and with +:.h em the price of silver, the 
ap;: reciation of silver as a monetary standard vvill have 
deflationary c onsequences. When the pri ce of s ilver is 
falling o r r i sin g more than t he world general pri ce, the 
discrepancies in their movements tend to exagg era t e t he 
infla t i onary or defl ationary c onsequenc e s as the c ase may 
be. Onl y in the unusua1 case and !rhrough the i.nflu ence 
of non- e conomic factors, when t he price of silver d ec1ines 
ap;ainst rising wor1d general :nrices or when it rises in 
face of falling worl d general pri ces do we find a similari t~ 
in the direction in whi ch genera1 p rice s i n silver-using 
country and t hose in t he world will move under normal 
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conditions. 'Th e price in silver st.andard coun t r y vJill move 
in an oppo site di r ec t-.i on to the movemen t of t he world 
gene r8.l p rice s and vdll be in a l arge ·meas ure isol ated 
from t he di f fusing influenc e o f the l at.ter. 
~!'his dis cuss i on of t he me chan ism of t he in ternal 
• J • b i , . l . d • ' • '-h 1 • ' f equL. l r um, wn 1 e 1n 1c a "G lng -..... e comp_ex l -r.y o t he p ro-
blem of r ead jus t:ment once t he equ i l:i.brium is d is t urbed, 
p o i nt-. s t o the basi c and cblicate d ifficul t ies wi t h which 
t he operation of silver standard i s c onfronted. 
B. Silver and Exchang e 
As we hav e a lready dis cu s sed t h at t he exchang e be tween 
China ~:md gold-s t anda rd coun t ries dep end primarily upon t he 
Dr ice o f silv e r in world marke t . On t he o t her h and, 
fluc t u at i ons in the bal ance of payments b etwe en China an d 
g ol d-us ing cou_,_"'l t ries, considerably s pe culB.ti ve a c t i vi t ies 
in Shanghai , reac t on t he price of silver. 
Among t he g old-s tanda rd coun t ries i~her~ is a par of 
exchan ge represent i ng t he r atio bet-.we en t he gold con tent 
of their respe c t ive co inf:1 . Bet·we e n s :tlver-using coun trie s, 
tbere Cl'l.n be no f ixed par , but t here i s a k ind of mov ab le 
par , which f l uctua +-.es wi t h t he V8.ri 8.t :Lon of the silver 
price in London or New York . Th i s movable par , o r pari ty 
as i t is cnll e d , is t he amoun t in g old cen ts o f En g lish 
pence which the si lver in a Shanghai tael is wor t h at the 
day ' s s i lve r p r ice in N . Y . or London . Since, in g eneral, 
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the flow of silve r is into China instead of ou t of it; it 
is b etter t o tak e as the amoun t of silve r t a e l the 521. 619 
grains requir ed by t he smel tin~ s h ops, ra t her t han t he 
t h e o r et i ca 518.512 g r a in s . Silve r in N . Y . is quoted in 
cen t s per ounce of 480 grains 0 . 9 99 fine or 479.520 g rains 
and 1.000 fine. In London, t he quota t ion i s per ounce of 
4 80 g :ra:.tns and 0.925 fine, or 444 grains an d 1.000 fine. 
r hu s the corresp on ding p8.r i ty r at io may b e t a k en as 
521.619 
479.520 = 1.08 8 and 
5 21.619 
444.000 = 1.175 
'Ih a t i s , t h e N. Y . silver p rice mul t.i p l ied b y 1. 0 88 s.nd 
the London s ilve r p rice multip li e d by 1.175 g ive the 
equi v a len t v alue, o r pari ty , of t he Sh anghai t a el in 
gold cents Gnd s te rlj_ng p ence s rep ecti,vely. 
'The s ilver price, however, is in its elf a very unstabl 
v ari abl e . In t he middle half of t he 19th it was about 
$1.30 an ounce. In g eneral, the t rend h a s b e en d ovmward 
since 1 873, vrhen t he support of i t s p rice g iven silver 
stand ard an d b i me t alli sm in some coun t ries were removed . 
During t he fir s t World War, owing t o decrease i n s ilver 
produc ti on an d grea t i n c reased d emand for i t s c o inag e a ll 
ov er the wor l d , which wa s c au s ed by the i n creased export 
of r aw material f r om Ind i a s nd Crdn a , an d a lso due t o 
t he genera l r i s e of al l c ommodi ty pric e s, t h e pr ice of 
s ilver r ose t o a leve l e quiva l e n t t o that prior t o 1870. 
The h i gh s ilver price during t h e wa r and righ t a f t er that. 
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war thre a tened the token silver coins of many coun tries 
be c ause t hey thu s be c ame more valuable a s me ta. l than as 
coin s . Beginning in 1920, the p rice of silver came dovm 
r a.p idly with the incre a se of production. Indi a adop t ed a 
g old bullion s tandard and began t o d isp ose of surplus rupee~. 
A l arge qu anti t y of these rupees v1ere poured in t o China, 
un t il June, 1 930 , when the silver pric e re a ched an all-
time min i mum of 15 7/ 16 d. in London and ~3 1/4 cen t s in 
N. Y. 
In addi t i on t o t he long- time change s i n t he price of 
s ilver , the fluctua t ion s from day to day , c aused by ch~mges 
in the flow of paymen t s and by spe culat ion, B.re v e ry 
cons iderable. 
I. Effect of Exchang e on r.I'rade 
As a resul t; of these rapid an d cons ide rable f luctua-
t ion s , a ll i mpor t an d export busines s in India is highly 
spe culative . The i mpor t trade i n Chi n a , un t il recent 
y ears, ha s been c arr i ed on by fo reign f irms, a c t ing e ithe r 
a s E. ales agents of 8. foreign rranufac t.urer, or a s 
independen t middl emen, i mporting f oreign g oods , some t i mes 
in d e fini te order fr om Chine se merchan ts . 
As a typ ic a l exs.nmle , 8. Chinese mer chant contacts a 
f oreir,n h nporter in Shanghai , f or certain quant i t i es of 
good s t o b e ordered and delivered in Shangh a i wi thin four 
mon t hs at a c er tain gold dollar price, which h e mu st· pay on 
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the arr- ival of g oods . 'The foreign importe r theoreti c a lly 
j_ s perfectl y safe a s he is buying wi th gold and sell ing 
f or g old . 'l 'he Chine s e mer chan t , on the o t her, is buying 
with gold and selling for silver. He migh t , if he v.ri.shed, 
make an exchange c ontract. with a bank by whi ch the ba..11k 
agree s to sell him f our months hence a N. Y . draft for the 
n e ces s2ry cr:1oun t , at a ra t·e which will be aprroximately 
tha t of the present . If he does it, he kn ows in advance 
exac t ly how much the g oods are going to cos t him j_n silver. 
It seems t ha t. he i s pro t eci~ed . However , if at t he end of 
four rnon th.s , the rate t b.en woul d giv e him the gold draft 
for fewer taels, he will be s orry that he contracted to 
pay a l a rger number of taels. On the other 'hmd, if he 
doe s no t settle exchange in advance , e..nd the tael cost of 
gold goes up, he would wish tha t he had settled. 
The foreign i mpor t-er , while seemly pro t ec t ed by having 
the v~·hole tran s 8_c t ion in g o ld , may find thB.t exch2.nge 
lo ss es have rnade h is Chinese cus t omer bankrupt or at any 
ra t e unwilling to tal{e t he g o ods at the con t ract price. 
'Ihus he rna_y be forced to compromise on a lo·wer price or 
be lef t with the unsold goods on b is hands. Similar 
p roblems confront t hose in t he export trade. 
'IneoreticFJ.llv , a high exchang e r ate, t ha t is high 
gold v a l ue for the tael helps i mpor t , for the Chinese 
me rchan t c e.n then secure a gren+-.er quantity of for·eign 
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g oo ds for the same a.monnt of silver . Never t heless , a 
high exchange r ai-e puts u p t:he gold cost o f exrJor t ed 
Chinese produc t-,s and tend s t o reduce t he d em2nd ::md 
en c our,-:1p.; e subs t i t u te and so reduce t he export trade. 
Jus t t he oppo s i te effe c t , one V·!oulo f ind from a 
low rate of exchange . 'l"ne co s t o f a ll imp orted cow.rnodi ties 
r i s e s in symp B.thy ; and the imp orted trade is badly crippl e d 
'l1he export trade theoreticall :r is he l p ed. 
II. Speculat ion 
As in t he c as e of internal price level, trade c an 
be c ome ad justed t o a l mo st 2ny exche.n e e level, but the 
nrocess of s.d justing t o a rap idly chanp;inr; one is 
uai nful and vvas t.eful. '!Jhe busines sman performs specu-
l at:ton in exchange . A great d e a l of s pe cul 2,ti on v~as done 
by bo t h forei gner s and Chine se . The former bought or 
sold exchange in Lon don or N . Y . mar1cets. 'lhrough the 
b tmks , Ch ine se rPay a l so do ·the same th in r.: ; bu t in addition 
the y sp e cul ate i n a c t ual gold b ars on the Chinese g old 
stock exchanc;e , wh e r e t he annual t urnove r is i n t he 
neighborhood of one b il lion doll ars in g dd. Campara t i vely, 
lit t le real g ol d exchanged hands , but transac tion s a re 
norm ally in terms of gold bars of certa in weight and 
finene s ~~ , who se pri ce in tael f'luc t uatesthrough t he d s.y . 
Se t tlemen t.s ar e made mon thl:r by pa_yj_n g differenc e rather 
t hsn by a c t ual delivery . 
C. World Currency a11.d China 1 s Economy 
At t he end of the 19th century mo st countries had 
es tabli shed t he g old standard. Down to a few decades ago, 
t he bulk of +-.he world 1 s silver wa s used B. s curTency. Stock 3 
of t he white me t al steadily increase. After t he si lver was 
droppe d fr om the currency lis t in some economically 
a dvanced c ountries, t he demand for silver gre s.tly 
decreased. As a r esul t , t here was a marked f al l in t he 
value and purchasing p ower of silver from abou t 1 885 down 
t o 1 914, and gradually declined again until 1929 • 
. Due to China's foreign trade and financial relations 
with o t her countries, the Chinese market wa s v ery sensitive 
to world devel oprre nt. Conditions in Gre ec t Bri tain, v·rho 
ho.d ·t-;he most i mporttmt t r 8.de relation wi t h China , had 
been of g r eHtest j_nfluence and the purchasing power of 
si lver in England was greatl:r rela t ed t o t ha t of silver 
in China. 
The glob al e conomi c al crisis in 192 9 brou~ht a bout a 
rapid decline in the price of 8 0ods in t he world market. 
For a ·while , duri.n r; 1931, the gener8_l fall in t he pr ice 
of o t he r conwo d i t ies v; a s grenter t han t h a t in t he p rice 
of s ilver, so t hat the decline in purcha s ing p owe r of silve1 
was che c k e d somewhat. The most impor t an t. change in 1931, 
hOweve r , was Br i t i nn ' s abandonment of g old stande,rd. 
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Silv er , whose value jumpt.ed in sta..TJ.tl y , begsn to exchange at 
a much more favorable rate with the devalued Pound. 
Wi th respe c t t o i-he U. S . Dollars, the Chines e d ollar 
con t inued to declin e at a much lesser rate in 1 932 since 
the f ormer did no t devaluate i ts currency un t il 1933 . 
The commodi ty pr ice fell rapidly in t he United States , 
who main tained its currency at par until t he fourth ye~:-1r 
of its economic crisis~ Silver de clined more rapidly 
than o t her corr .. modi t ies un ti l 1932 . 
Earl y in 1 934 the U. S . abandcn ed i t s gold standard ; 
a s a resul t of whi ch t he re was a rapid rise in t he pr ice 
of silver in rel a i-.ion to the dev alued dol lar . Due t o 
this an d o t her influences, including t he abandonment 
o f t he gold s tande.rd by s everal countries of mino r 
importance in China's trade, +.he purchasing powe r of 
si lver rose fur ther in Ch ina in the yes.r of 1933. 
With the sen s itiveness of t he Chinese market t o 
world cond i tions , the influence of the silver purchasing 
p olicy of the U. S . Government in 1934 was immed i ate l'md 
ser i ous. Owing t o t he devaluation of o t her curr encies 
in relation t o silver , the white metal had been rising 
in v a lue falling s ince 1931. The artifici a l raising 
of silver price by the U. S . Gove rnment greatly a ccentuated 
these dev e lopments . Silver, rising i n value , b egan to 
l eav e t he c o1.mtry in enormous quantity. Price, especi a lly 
on agricultural products fell rapidly. 'J.he se condi t ions 
had the most serious effect upon n.ational e conomy . 
From 1925 on, the declining value of silver in world 
market created 2. si tv.ation on which was very ·favorable to 
the Chinese exporters. Wh.ile prices of goods in China 
(reckoned in si lver) were increasing, the price of Chinese 
g oods in the world ms.rket were de clining due t o i~he 
depreciated s:Uver exchange.. I~b.ny exporters reached their 
maximum s a les in 1931 when most of the world was deep in 
the economic slump. 
'I'he d.eprecie. tion of silver value resulted in two 
main changes in China' s t rade: At. first, t here was a 
s+.eady increase in export total ; and at the same t ime, 
the quanti ty of Chine se imports declined . 
During the ye a r when the silver· value was falling, 
t here was a ch2nge in the nature of China 1 s exp orts. 
The fEtvorRble exch811p;e condition s timu1ated manuf8.cturing 
for export . Ch ina a chieved at t- imes a favorable trade 
balance . ri'he general trade baltmce for the five years 
f rom 1 927 to 1931 was t he first t ime sinc e 1826 in the 
Chine se history. During t his period of depreciating 
silver end in c reasing exports , t he amount of silver 
p ouring in t o China fr om abroad vvas in large qu::mt.i t ies. 
For instance, t he net i mport announced by the Chinese 
me.ritime custom in 1 928 amounted to ~Bl,OOO,OOO ,OOO. 
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The abandonment of the gold standard in Gre at Britain 
and other c oun~ries , however, ushere d in a n ew era . 
Mo dern Governments elsewhere already p o ssessed the 
p owe r of control an d regul at ing of mone tary and banking 
sys tem. The Br i t ish Government establi shed direct 
s hl te c on t.rol of its monetary sys t ern and forei gn exchang e 
in September, 1 901 . 
One resul t of this managed devaluation of the 
curr ency was t hat silver imme dia t ely rose its prices 
in terms of n e w Pounds. By the end of 1 932 , most 
c ountries h ad a bandoned the old me·tal standard and 
es t abl ished a sta t e-managed pap er curren cy . The U. s . 
f in ally followed this a c t ion in April, 1 933 . In t he 
new curr encies, silver stood much higher in VBlue than 
i t had done in re lat ion t o g old; its purchasin g p owe r 
in China vvas t hereby increased and prices showing a 
s t e ady decline. 
'Ihe trend of Ch ina's t rade for t he year follovdng 1931 
was c ompl ic a !-ed by ma11y fa c t or s: Fir st in import3nce 
was the J apanese occupa t ion of China 1 s Manchuria whi ch 
wa s the lead ing se c tion s in Chinese exports. The 
separat ion of t hes e prov :inces f r om China mem t the 
eliminati on of one-fif t h of the t ota l value o f export 
in Ch:i.n a 1 s j_n t erna t i onal balance. 
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The c onfli c t betwem . Chin a and J ap an a t Shanghai 
in 1 932 c ompletely paralyzed shipning , coJ:TI.rrerce and 
indus try in t his Cb ina 1 s g re a test p ao t . Consequen t ly , 
Shanghai ' s trade for t he year g r eatly decl ined. 
From 1932 to 1 933, there wa s a fur t her de c rease in 
t he t ota l value of fo r eign trade , though t hi s decrease 
in Value was gre 2 te r t han the decreas e in volume. 
V~orl d trade as a whole de c lined b;r more t han 6'o!& 
between 1 929 2nd 1932 . In the same period , however, 
Ch i na 's foreign trade a c t ually increased, so t hat her 
p roDo r t ion of vmrld trad e almost doubled . In g eneral , 
t h e f oreign trade of ChinH in 1933 (ex clusive of Man churia ) 
was comnarable vii th that for 1 929 , vJhere a s her export 
d eclined 40?~ . S:he main de c line in Chin n 1 s expor t s 
in 193::3/4 was in shipments to J apan and t he U. s ., a 
f a ll whi ch was con nec t ed with the de c line in the nyen 11 
and t he American dollar rela t ive t o t he silver do l lar . 
By Mar ch 1934 , wholesale price in Shanghai had 
fall en t o 96 . 6 per cent , and by Aprll t o 94 . 6 . The 
same resul t s spread throu ghout the country an d sev e red 
t he n ational e c onomy . Price of agri cul t ural p roduc t s 
h ad a l ready declined , an d the v alue o f land r;re atly 
depre c iated , besid e whi ch the c ontinued d e cline of si l k 
expor ts and sil k p rice deprived l arge number s of farmers 
of t :l:Ei_r in come from s ericul t ure . 'l'he fal l i n exp orts of 
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raw ma t erj_al a lso af'fe c ted many farmer s . IJ.'he slump in 
i ndus t; r ;r and production c aused ma ss unemploymen t . Farmers 
c ould no t pay +:hei r rent and tax vii th d eclining p rice of' 
their crop s . 
Be c au se of the overwhelmingly agri cultura l nature 
of China ' s population , the disparity of' agriculture 
and industrial pri ce has been an very imp or tant factor 
in her economi c crisis . 
The e f f_ec t_, f th 1 · d ~ · 1 9~2/7. s o _, e s ump upon J_n _ us l_. ry 1n '""~ o wa 
regj_s t ered by a g r eat increase in unemployment . Fac t ories 
j_n C01'!1Jrlerc ial cen ters, such as Shanghai, were seriousl y 
affected by t he los s of overseas markets , as sociat ed with 
u:'lf a v orable foreign exchange as well as t he d ecline in 
domestic purchasin g p owe r . 
In 1934, c ondit ions be c ame still worse . 'lhe fall 
i n p ric es b_o_d fi rs t affec ted manufac t urers and l andovming 
fArmers , vvhile farm l a bore rs and such o ther vmrkers 
' 
who main t.ained i n emp l oyment were a ide d by lowe r li vin~ 
co s t . But as t he ec onomic condition go t wor se , wages 
both for farmers and factory worker s sank ine vitable. 
-r 1 • 1 k 1 -l d · ...:! , h · 
-n t .c1e meantime , sJ. ver s t oc _ a ccumu ar~e J.n unang _al . 
\ 
Dovm to 1 9:."·3 8 net i mpor t of silver in t o China c ontinued 
and t ota led 439 , 340 , 000 fine oun ce s , which wa s almost 
3;~ of t he 'Norld 1 s entire stoc k . 
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D. China and The Ris ing Price of Silver 
Prior t o the establishment of the N8_ti onal Government, 
China c ould hardly be s ai d t o have any national monetary 
p ol i c y . As already men t i oned , imuerial official s or t heir 
mili tary an d civil succ es sors at times is sued fia t currency 
end e ngaged in banking op e r a t ions for t heir ovvn purposes , 
n ot guided by any c ons iderat ion of n a tional e c onomy or 
publi c welfare . 
'I'h e 8_ctivity of t he National Government in setting -
up t he Central Bank of China, in establi shing the custom 
g o l d unit t o prote c t i tself in connection with f oreign 
b l. t • o --:-J- 1';8. l Ons , i n aboli s h ing the archaic tael , in 
esta blishing a new n at ional dollar a t a r a te tending t o 
rai s e Ch inese price nearly 2~ , in extending its c ontrol 
ove r banki ng both in t he wny of r e gulation and direction, 
h ave already t race d at length. These ste-os toward t he 
-'- -
o rganiz a t:lon , coordination , centraliz a tion and unification 
of Chin a 1 s currenc y and banldnD:, and t he development of a 
n a tional sys t em, were of vital impor t an c e and made p ossible 
the establishment of c on trol ove r foreign exchange , t:.he 
nationalization of silv er , and the se t ting up of a 
manag ed currency in China in 1 934 and 1 935 . 
Conditions cau s ed by external pressure finally forced 
China to tak e this latter action (Man aged currency). Sir 
Ar thur SB_lter, in h is "S tudy of Chj_na and Depression" in 
1 934 , noted t hat nthe denressi on in China b egan not in 1929 
as i t did elsewhere , but only in the 1.!il inter of 1 931. Durin ~. 
· t he firs t two years of the world depre ssion, China vms less 
a f f ec ted by it than any o t her coun t.!"! . The i mpor tant 
c auses of t he denre ssion in China were t he appreci at ion 
of silver i n t erms of t he f o reie;n curren cie s and t he c on-
flic t with Jap an over Manchuri a as wel l as in Shan ghai i n 
1932 and in J eho l in 1 933 , which co s t Ch ina t he loss of 
tr a de an d revenue. Of cours e , the silver poli cy of t h e 
Un i ted State s Government was ano th er factor vvh ich further 
severed 1-.he curren c y dis t urbance in China. 
The world e conomi c conference c alle d at London f or 
J u ly , 133, was .intend ed t o deal wi t h various e f fe cts of 
the world crisis . With reg a r d to monetar;r poli cy , t he 
disagreement of .the Amer ic an Government t o link h er 
currency with any o t her mone tary system caused t he fai lure 
of s tandardization of currencies a t the existing leve l. 
The agreemen t r eached in silver, however , aimed t o in-
crease +~he v alue of the pr ice of white mets l. This p ro posa , 
mainl y to the a dvant a ge of si lver mln j_n g i nte r ests , V'Jas 
b rough t forwar d by the Amer ic an delegation . The U . S . 
is one of t he gre a test pro ducers of silv er , while China 
is the g re atest c onsumer , so a d ive r gence of in t eres.t 
i s understo.ndable . 'I'he Americ an desire for an open 
silver market an d parti a l remone t iz a t ion , was in dire c t 
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conflict with the Chinese desire · for a st;abilization on 
the price of v;hi te metal, and preferably with no increase 
in its value. 
'rhe silver agreement limited the Indian Government's 
yearl;r sales of s ilver to the maximum a l ready reached 
(35 million ounces annually ), whi le the great silver 
producers (The U. S . and Mexico ) agreed not t o sell 
silver ou t side of the ir b orders, and to purchase .from 
the market 35 million fine ounce s of their ovm silver 
produr!ti on yeRrly. The fourth arti cle of the agreement 
provided ' that ."the Government of China shal l no t sell 
silver resulting from d emonetized coins for a per iod of 
four years con~encing January 1, 19~~ . 
In June, 1934 , a bil~ was pas sed in the Congress of 
the United States to n ational ize silver stocks, and 
perm:t tt ing the Se cre t-.ary of t he 'T'reasury +:o purchase 
silver not only at home but also abroad at such time s, 
r Hte s and terms as he th:Lnks advisable. In August, 1934, 
the same Government a c tually begrm t he nat ionalization 
of silver at home, and . the nurch.ase of 8dd i tional silver 
from abroad whose nrice being much higher than the current 
market quo ta tion. 1JVorld silve r p rice rose and China wa s 
faced with a new crisis. 
The immediate thre8 t was of a sudden and ca t.astrophic 
drop in p rices of commodities in China. 'I'he decline ·which 
had b een going on sinc e 1 931 was a l ready having grave 
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effects upon t he national economy ~ The purchase o f silve r 
by t he United States i n the world marke t at a rate c on-
siderably higher +:han that already existing me ant t hat 
s j_l v e r would be drmvn from Ch inn in such h u ge quantit i es 
that i t s p ri c e woul d b e sJw- ro cke ting and t hat t he p ri c es 
of other cor.modities would fur t her decline . 
I t wa s evident that for the pro t ections o f her price 
and curre n cy leve l , China would h ave to denend upon her-
self , and take her ovm measures. Fo l l ow-ing the line of 
e c onom:t.c nationalsim adopted by other states , China 
had finally been forced t o the same policy . On October 
14, 1 934 , t he 1'1at ional Government announced a tax on export 
of si l ver from Ch i n a , fu~d official control of the foreign 
exchange ra t e . 
'1'he outflow of silver reached a.n enormous p roportion , 
bu t the g overnment postponed action , wishing to ma i nta i n 
t he silver standard . Final l y on September 9 , the Ministry 
of F inance is sued n manda t e prohibiting , until further 
notice, purcha se and sale of forei gn exchange , except for 
the purpo s e of financing: 
1 . Le g i tima t. e and n o rmal busin ess requirements ; 
2 . Con tre_c t s en·i-e red into on or before September 8 , 
1934; and 
3 . Reasonable traveling or person a l requirements . 
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This decree was called out by the sudden snd enormous 
drain of s ilver out of China. Recorded imports an d exp orts 
of silver t o and from China from 1931 t o t he end of 1934 
1 
were as follows: 
i mports exports excess of import 
1931 ~?118 , 233' 016 <il> ~p4 7' 429,618 $ 70, 803,335 
excess of export 
1932 96,538,889 109,933, 954 10' 3 '~! 5 ' 065 
1933 80 ,4 32 ,470 9 L1- ' 854' 914 14,422,440 
1934 7,414 , 00 9 267 , 355 , 432 259, 941,433 
From July to October of 1 834 net export of silver 
amoun ted t o over $ 200 , 000 ,000, r e ac)J i n g $ 79 , 000,000 in 
Au gus t , when the United State s Government a ctually b egan 
the purcha se of silver abroad . 
~rhe Na t ional Government assumed official control of 
foreign exchange, aj_ming to divorce China ' s currenc y from 
world silver p rice by i mposing duty on silver export. 
Thou.c::h +-here was con siderable smugglin c-~ of silver out of 
t he coun t ry, the offici a l control over forei gn exchange 
was successful and the p rice level was relatively stable 
durin g that p eriod of time . 
In 1934, silver i n foreir;n h ands and foreign bank s 
left. the country ::i.n larg e quantity, o-re rating under ext ra-
territoriality and claiming exemption from Ch j_nese law. 
From May to December cr tha t year , t here wa s a de crease 
1 Ch inese Maritime Custom Repo1•ts 
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of $ 203,000 , 000 in the si lver stock of foreign bank s as 
compared wi t h a decrea s e of 1;;57, 000,000 in t he silver 
sto c k of Chinese bank s. Credit b e c ame v e r y t i ght with 
the forei gn banks. The tota net ou t flo w of t he metal 
from Chin a in 1934 \'VaS estimated by the Bank of China at no 
les s than f$370, 000 , 000 worth. 
\!vhile China st:Ul beinp, on the silver st8ndard 
internally, u p t o 1935 , Ch:i.ne se banks paid out silver 
against ban1motes on d emand, bu t li t+-le of the v1hi t e 
metal r eturned to t h e banks . As a r esul t , banking 
inst i tut ions e lsewhe re f01 . .md j_t necessary t o ap•Jl y 
repeatedl y to Shanghai for silver t o rep l enish t heir 
stocks. 
In 1 835 , the Bs.n k of China 2nd Bank of Communic at ion 
were nationalized , 2nd brought t ogether wi th the Cen tral 
Ban1~ of China as a g roup of thr ee great state bank s a ble 
t o c arry out a c entralized and unified currency and 
bankin g policy f or t he n at ion as a whole. National cur-
rency repl a ced provincial currenc ie s in one locality 
after an o t her. 
At +he s ame time , the p o s i ti on of t he extr a-
terri t ori al b ank in China was 1:ve a kened greatly . Their 
exp or t of s ilve r i n 1934 and 1 935 , t hough highl "l! profi t able 
f or t he time be ing , lef t them v1i th such limited s ilve r 
reserv e that +:hey were n o t only in a p osit ion t o exte n d 
... .. 
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new lo ans, but a lso we re unable t o renevv exl s t.j_ng mortgages 
B.nd lo ans . 'l1helr note is s ue , whi ch at one time wa s of much 
importance , dropped with t heir lo ss of r~ves. · The total 
silver holding of foreign banks vYas less than 1/5 of thos e 
of the Chinese banks in Sh anghai alone , where the great 
bulk of t he silver holdlngs of foreign banks in China was 
cen +~ered . 
In spite of the successful Government con trol of 
foreign exchange, t he continued circulation of s ilver 
within China inevitably led to a steady drain of the 
v1hi t e metB.l out of the country . Sl l ver smuggled out o f' 
t he coun try regularly by foreign subjects under the 
extra- terri to rial jurl sdic tion , whose a.uthori t ies refused 
to check t heir unl awful act:ivl T. ies . 
On February 15, 1935 , a monetary Advisary Corfl.m i ttee 
orp;8.ni ze d by the Minis try of F inance, was inaug1.mted "to 
s ·l~udy and devise mea sures for the · improvement of the 
currency s ituationn. Res o lutions adopted by the 
Committee were submitted to Ministry for c onsiderations. 
Under this serious s ituation , Dr . H . H . Kung , t hen 
Minis ter of :F'inance , snalyzed the current condi t ions as 
follow s :l 
"The continuous rise in s ilver pri ce is owing t o (1) 
the r ising val ue of s iLver a broad tends t o increase its valuE 
~---------------
1 The Cen t ral Daily New s paper , Oct. 15, 1 935 . 
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at b.ome; (2) heavy exp or t s on silver have seriously con-
t racted curr ency and credit in China, which makes hi gher 
e x change and lowe r p r ic es." 
The continued r ise of t he silver price , however, h ad 
cau se d a cons i d e rable disp arity be t ween tl"' e v alue of a 
dollar in China and abroad. 'J!he silver con t ent of the 
Chin ese dollar had a ccord i ngly p l aced a p remium when it 
was expor :t-.ed f rom Ch i n a . I t is obviou s , t he refore, that 
t here wa s a s t rong t emptat ion t o smuggle as long as there 
was a premium on evading t he export res t ric t ions. And it 
is always difficul t to combf.l.t smuggling . 
Accompanying t he drain of silver ::md c ontraction of 
currency , money be c ame ex t remely t i ght and financing was 
very difficult . The unusually high rate of in teres t 
char·ges h ad made it p r a ctically imp ossib le t o borrow 
regardle s s of s ecuri t y. rche tightne ss of money had check ed 
re c on struct i on activities and interfered with norma l 
fi nnncing of the Government 's needs. 
De te rior a tion was fur t her reflected in t he decline 
of s tock and bond nrices . Moreover , the shrink age in 
real estate v alue had c aused the failure of both Chi nese 
and forei gn c oncerns, and s eriously i mpairs t he strength 
of others. Busine ss f a ilures and unemployment were a cute 
and wide- spread • 
• 
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For the purpo s e of strengthening t he Government contra 
over t he b anking struc t u re of t ho n a t ion, s o tha t i t will b J 
in a be tter po s i t ion to cop e wi t h t he i mpending f i n ancial 
cris~ the cen t r alization of b ank ing sy s t ems was vi t a lly 
nec ess a r y . 
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Chapte r D1 
CHINA ' S NEW CURRENCY SYSTEM 
A. The Curren cy end Banking Si t u at ion in 1 935 
The ad opt ion of a s tate- man aged cuf' r ency in November, 
1935 , was a revoluti on in Ch ina ' s mone t a r y sys t em, even 
t houf h the Chinese Government vvas onl y f o l lowing the 
foo tsteps of o t her n at ions . Va rious spe c i a l conditions 
exis ted in Chi n a : t h ere was the n resence of three p rincip a l 
kinds of me t a l a nd a wide ran ge of paper notes; there was 
t he adminis tra t ive Rnd f i n ancial d ecen t r aliza"Si on; t here 
wa s t he fe.c t 1-.hat the . . l prlnClpa_ s tand a rd ( silver ) of 
c·urren cy had be en one whi ch was n o longer used in most 
parts of -'-he "'-'Or ld . Above a ll , t here was the exis t ence of 
those currenc y - issuinp: fi n a.Ylci a l insti t uU_ ons enjoyin g t he 
privileg es of extrs - -s e rri toriali t y . I t v1as n e ces sary and 
exi gen ce for t he Chinese Govermrent t o es tablish a modern 
unified curr ency, s tate- con trolled , with the def inite aim 
of se rving an d improving the nation ' s e c onomy . 
By Oc t ober, 1 935, silve r currency in China 1Nas e s t i -
mated at about ~~ 1 , 500 million dollars , of which l / 3 was 
held by the ban l:::: s in Shan gh a i . Ano t her sum of ab out 
.!~4 50 mil l ion d ol lars was in circulation throughou t the 
c oun t r y in t he form of subsidi a ry coins . At t he t i me when 
nat i onalization of silv er was enfo r ced , a.l mo st 2/3 of 
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China's supn ly of me t a l wa s eith e r held by Chinese banks 
~ s r e s e rve a~a inst p aner currency or circul a t ing as sub-
sidiary co ins wh:ich c ontinued t o be le g a l tender . Le ss 
t han d~600 million ac t.u a ll;r was in circulation . The total 
quantity of banknotes j_n circulation t h rou p,hou t China j_n 
Oc+-.ober 1 935 right prior t o the national ization of si lve r 
amoun t ed t o 1!i600 million , of whi ch ~ 430 mill ion were notes 
of the t hree g ov e"!'nment c on t rolled banks . Bankno t.es thus 
alre ady circulated widely t han s ilver dollar . 'I'he number 
of subsidiary silver coins circulating at that time was 
estimated at 3 , 000 million, at the value of 450 million 
na t ional doll ars . The total value of copp er coin a lone 
was a bou t 220 million nat i onal dollars. 
In January 1 936 , the Cen t ral Mint started production 
of new subsidi ary token coina p e of n icke l and copper, to 
be s t r ictly repre sentat ive in value. The nickel coins 
were in the den ominD. t.ions of 20, 10 and 5 cents, weighing 
respec t ive l y 6 , 4 .5 and 3 grams , and conta ining n icke l of 
1 00% fineness. They were the legal tender up t o $ 20 . 
The copp er coins were in the denomina t ions of 1 and 1/2 
cents, weighing 6 . 5 and 3 . 5 grams , of 955b cop p er cmd 5 % 
tin- zinc alloy for both . And t heir l egal t ender vvas $ 5.00. 
A g old uni t V'Ja s used as t he standa rd i n the paymen t 
of i mport du t ie s . ~'he Custom Gold uni t,, v:.rhich circulated 
_j 
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Only in paper form, represents 60.186 6 centigrams of pure 
gold. The paper n o tes we re i ssued only by t he Central 
Btm1{ of China, aga.in s t 10076 g old re se rve, and the issue 
was sma ll. 
The Chinese GovernmBnt exercised i t s con tro l of 
n 2.t ional currency throu gh a Currency Re serve Bo ard , wh ich 
in t urn throu gh t hree mai n g overnment be.n k s-- t he Central 
B2.n k of China , t he Ba.n k of Ch ina , an d the Ban k of Communica 
t i on . f h es e banks , t hen, exercised t heir con t rol t hrough 
t heir sgencies Bnd a number of s emi- gove rnment b anks . 
The Currency Res e rve Bo a r d , created by the .Minis try of 
Finance in 1 935 in order t o cen trs.lize c ontrol over 
note-is sue end c onsolidat e t he credit of n a tiona l 
currency , c ons isted o f a speci a l represen t a t ive of the 
Minis t.ry of F inance, t wo representat ives from each of 
the three main government banks, t wo r epresentatives 
fr om e 2.ch of t he o t her banks; and the governor of the 
Cen t ral Bank of China was concurrently Cha.irman of t he 
Bo ard . I t had the cus t ody of reserves against outstanding 
legal t ender banknotes , the contro l of the ir j_ssue and 
re t irem en t , and the right t o determine t he amoun t of the 
re serv e to be d e p osited in the three g ove rnment banks. 
The t hree big g ove rnment bank s, even befor·e the 
e s tab l i sbm.ent of the manage d currenc y , were the issuers 
of mos t of the banlr,no te s circul at ing in China . r he notes 
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issued by the Central Bank of China , at the end of 1935, 
8.moun t ed to ~~ 1 31,246,000 t h a t by the Bank of China 2.mounted 
to ~~ 11 9 ,456,000 and tha.t by the Bank of Communicati on sunrrne i 
~SR4, 8 63,000 . 
The note issue of the o t her Chinese banks whose notes 
still in circul ation might no t be increased, though the 
no~es would be a llowed to continue in use until t hey could 
be rep laced by tho s e of 1-he government bank s. 'I'he 
unofficial no t e - issuing b 8.nks must h? nd over the metal 
and o t her securi t ies t hey held a g ains t -t-heir ov.1n no t e -
issues t o t he three government banks, who were responsible 
s . for 2,11 h anknotes redeemable in lv:-. nghal. 
Prior to the establishment of the National Government, 
there was no state c on t rol even on note issued by banks. 
Now such control was a cc e n ted as a ma tter of course a s 
in o ther nar t s of the world. 
The Imperial Government official, after the foreign 
silver dollar had c o:r:1e tnto a..lmost general use in China, 
started t he minting of silver (both doll1:1.rs and subs idiary 
currency) , a s wel l as of coppe r coins. This mintin g was 
no t centralize d , bu t was in t he hands of -provincial 
offlci a l s , who found the production of new c oins 8. highly 
:orofi ·l ~ able enter:orise and carr1ed it on t o the point of 
deb asement . The Irnpe r icl Gov e rnment carried an off ic a l 
tae l curr en cy u n til t he end of i t. s li f e. Provincial banks, 
- --· ---
- -- . -----· 
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in the same way, were frequently u sed by provinci a l 
officials for the issue of fiat currency for their 
currency . 
B. China Re volutionized Its Currency 
Had the National Government i n October, 1 934 , attempte · 
to abandon silver both as an in ternal Bnd external standard 
it might have en coun tered serious diffi cul t ies. During the 
year which follo wed , howe ve r , the currency was brought more 
and more under Government con trol. A s +a.te banking system 
wa s established, including the three g r eatest banks in 
China. Stocl{s of silver in these banks vvere main tained 
at a high leve l, whi le t h e stock s i n private hands--
par t i cularl y in the hands of f oreign banks-- were :much 
reduced. The no te circulation of the banks, though 
much less tha.n was warranted by their reserves of t reasure, 
grew steadily t hroughou t the year. The t otal i s sue of 
b::mk no te s b~r Sh:::mghai b an ks had risen from 350 million 
doll ars at t he end of 1933 t o 4 10 million at the end of 
1 904, ~mel 416 mi llion (in spite of a g r eat reduction in 
the number of foreign bankn o te s) by the . end of October 
1 935 . Of t he l ast-n amed fi gures, ove r 005 million doll ars ' 
wor·t-h of notes 'Here issued by the t hree great Government 
banks. 
Banl<.note issues co:rmnanded the complete t .rust and 
confidence of the public. The National Governmen t , in its 
- ·--=-==!!===-====-=-=-=-=-=--=-=·-==== ==========~========== 
Bankin g Laws p romul p, c. t e d in 1 9 31, had l a id i t d own t h a t 
i s suing b m1.ks must hol d s pecie re s erv es for no t less th~:m 
60 p e r c en t o f their is sue , be sid es 40 per c ent in r ap i d l y 
n ego t i able bond s , snd t his prov isi on wa.s fu l l y enforc ed . 
In s p i te of t h e difficult p o s i t ion in 1 934 , ther e was n o t 
a s i ngle f ailure on t h e part of i ssu ing banl~ s , and no t es · 
were redeema~l e for s ilver . 
Be c au s e o f t he ir rel i Etbi l i ty an d c onveni en c e , t he n o te 
issu e d in Shan ~1-, e. i r a ·d .d l -v p ass e d i n t o circul a t ion in the 
. . . . 
interior , where t h e y we r e in great demand . Bo t h the 
modern and 11 Ns t i v e 11 b an k s f ur t h e r e d ~hi s process , t he 
l at t er cl a ss fin an c in g mo s t of Ch i n a 1 s in te r na l t r nde , and 
b ein g c onnec ted wi t h t he mo d e r n b anks at Shangh a i t h rough 
8.ccoun t. s wi t h the Gre Bt St a t e Ban k s . At t h e smne t i me , t h e 
is sue of no t es by v a riou s c omme r c i a l and me r c an t ile 
e st abli shmen t s , a s we l l as t he c onduc ting of ban k ing 
a c t ivi t i e s by t hem , wa s elimina t e d in t h e in t erior . No t 
onl Y +;h e more c omple t e au t .ho r i tv of t he Na t ional Gov e rnment 
":..J - \• 
bu t 2l s o t he h i gh d e g ree o f c onfidenc e reposed in Gov e rnmen 
con t;rol l ed ban kno te s and ban k in g , were e f fe c tive i n s.ch i e v h g 
t his end . 
I t wa s a lre a dy b e c omi ng e vid en t t h a t lower exchange 
r a t es would h ave t o b e e s tab l i she d in orde r to j_mp r o v e the 
e c onomi c si tua.tion . Th e v ari ous d evalut.ed curren c ie s 
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of o t-her coun trie s had by no me2ns 2. chieved a new s tabil ity 
in relation to g old and silver, but showed either p eriodic 
or steady decline. The p ound "sterl in g 11 , within four years 
of goin g off gold, had reached a depre ciation of over 40 
per cent. The Japnnese yen had a lso fallen--from about 
~~ 1. 25 in 1 902 , after abandon i ng p;o l d , to 70 cen ts . by the 
latter part of 1935. The U. S. dol lar dropped from about 
~t;3 .0 at tbe end of 1933 t o :ls 2.50 by the latter pt=~rt of 1935 
In view of this situn~ion, it was evident not only 
t ha.t China vwuld have t o take steps similar to other 
Governments to reduce the exchange value of her currency, 
but a lso that 8. Si~ ate-man2.ged curTency wolJld have to be 
l inked to some other currency in order to a chiev e stabiliza 
t ion. The pound n sterling" was of g r eat impor bmce not 
only in China's f oreign trade in world trade , and ~o st 
countrie s with managed curr encies had linke d vvi th Bri tian. 
Comm.erciEJ.l relations wi th the U. S . and parti cularly the 
si t u ation growinf:l; out of the Government 1 s silver-purchasing 
p ol icy , rendered it a lso i mpor tan t to have a definite link 
v'Ji th the Arne ric sn dollar. 
Government con t rol of foreign excmnge since October, 
1 934 , ao far 8. S it went , bad b een successful. Though 
announcement of this control had resulted in an i:rnmediate 
drop in exchange, there wa s rapid recovel"y, and 8. ye.?.r later 
the enforcement of the meaS1J.re exchange stood ·where it had 
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in October, 1934 . Condi tions being wh at they were , however 
it was i mnossible for t he Na tional Government to check 
the dra in of sl.lver from Ch ina so long as the metal con-
t inued to clrcula te free ly v,ri thin the country. In the 
meantime, the discrepancy between the "sterling 11 exch.smge 
8nd the silver p rice steadily increased. 
The exche..ng e value of the Chinese dollar was fixed. at 
the level it had reached at the time of t he mandate, and 
in order to l(eep it stable the three g overnment b anks V':ere 
authorized to buy an d sell forei gn exchange in u n limited 
qu antity . 
In order to control the issue and re tirement of legal 
tender bankno i-e s , and to ke ep custody of reserve agnins t 
outs tanding notes, a Currency Rese rve Board was provided 
for the Nati onal Government mandate, and b egan functioning 
in liTov ember. This Board desi gn sted the Central Bank of 
Ch ina , the Bank. of China, and i~.he Banl{ of Communic a tion 
as denositories for the custody of reserves, under control 
of the Board, against legal tender notes, the ~mount 
deposited in each Bank b e i ng d.e termine d by the Board. 
In the process of n Htionalizat ion of silver through-
out the c ountry , silver was required to hand ove r in 
e x change for legal f-md er notes. Varia t ion in exchB.nge 
rate between silver doll a m and legal t ender notes was 
forbidden, and violators of this ruling were facin g con -
fisca tion of no te s and silver. 
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With rega.rd to subsicUary silver and copper coins, 
no na t ional de cree was issued. 'I'h i s mai-.ter , being compli-
c ated by the fact that V8.rious silver end copper coins 
of widely v a ry i n g exchang e ra te s, were circulating in 
v a rious provinces and dis t ricts. Provincial an d local 
governments and bank associates dealt with these matters 
themOO.ves . In the meantime, the National Government 
p r enared for the issue of a new subsid i a r y token currency 
of nickel and copp er coins, to be a r a fixed relationship 
to t.he nHtional doll2.r . The minting of the s e nickel 
coin in denominations of 5, 1 0 and 20 cents and coppe r 
co ins in denominations of 1 and 1/2 cents b egan in June, 
1 936 . And t hey beg an to circul ate on February 1 0 . 
r he ~. pe cie reserve of various banks were h anded over 
t o the State b8.nks or t o rheir loc s,l bran ches for custody. 
Permanent offici als we re appoin t ed t o s upervise the 
reserve of t he nine no t e-issuing banks at Shanghai, as well 
as ot.hers . whlch were membe rs of the Chinese Bankers ' 
Association . This wa s a.p-p roved by t he Finance Minis t ry 
a t i~he e nd of November, and the supervisors s tarted their 
du t i es . 
At the same time , loc a l co:m.mittees were establi:shed 
for the st abiliza t ion of corrmodity nrice . These co111.mittees 
i n cluded local officials and also indus t rial guilds and 
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as s ociations. ~heir work was ne cessary , i n order that thr 
purpose s of the new m8.Da.ged currenc y should be ful ly 
effective in the control of prices . 
C. The Action of Foreign Countries in Respe ct to the Chinese 
Currency Reform 
In December, 1 935 , a modified American policy wa s 
inaugurated. 'l'he Amer ic an Government reduced i ts buying 
price for s ilver, with the result t hat the ·white metal 
dJ:io -pp ed from 60 3/4 to 51 1/4 per ounce in N . Y . in one 
week . 
'I'he Americ t:m Government a ccordingly reduced its 
purch2_se from London, whither so much Chinese silver had 
gone via Jan an and Honglwng , and started buying dire c tly 
from Chinese Market . There were h e avy arrivals in London 
of silver from Hongkong , but Amer ic an buying was for a 
time reduced to some 5% of the supplies offered . 
The new currency policy made it poss ible for the 
Chine se GovernmBnt to dispose of some of i ts s ilver for 
forei gn exchange without disturbance of interna_l financial 
and currency conditions . Owing t o possible effects u pon 
a sensit ive money market , the negotie.+:ion leading i·.o this 
v•ere of course k ept s t. rict.ly secret , and there was no 
cle ar a..11.nouncement made by '.!Vi ther the Chinese or American 
Government . In December, 19~5 , however, considerable 
shipment of silver direct from China. to the U. S . began. 
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Silve r wa s s old in order to provide additional reserve for 
exchBnge s tabili z a tion . 'J'ovmrd t he end of December i t vvas 
estimated that the Chines e Government held J.J 1 8 , 000 ,000 of 
forei gn exchang e . Th i s g s ve t he managed eurrency a bac k ing 
of some $ 300 ,000, 000 in exchan g e (par tieularly in ste rling 
and Ameri c an do llars ), in add i tion t o its silve r and 
o ther reserves . 
The t imely coop eration of t he Americsn B.u thori t ies 
in a ction t o s u p -por t t he Chine se curren c y reform, comi ng 
i:tr~.mediate ly after announcemen t of the reform of currency 
in November, 1 935. It provided a substan t ial amoun t of 
f ore i gn exchr;m,o:e reserve whi ch was of t he greatest value 
t o the Government in mainta i nin g t he stabili ty of ~he new 
currency and in gainin g the confidence of the public in 
the early period of t he r e form. 
An offiei a l Government corrmdssion of Enp:Jabd arr ive d 
at Honp;kon g in 1 931 t o inve stir,a t e the situat-ion and made 
the c onclusion t ha t 11 Hongkonp: is no t a producing but a 
. 
tran si t cen ter , its exports and imp orts 2.re almos t entirely 
on China 's a ccoun t ; t h e h'ade which it handle s is in 
rec.lity China ' s t r a de; ••• I t i s of t he utmost i mportance 
7-.has the colony 's curren cy should conform as closely as 
possible with that China , and that unnecessar7 exche.:nge 
iTans action s be elimina ted. 11 The location of Hon gkong 
gav e it great_advantage n s a center for smuggle r s. From 
79 
the time of the United States started her silver purchase 
a great export of t he white metal dev e loped from the little 
colony; shipments going forward bo t h to Lon don and to the 
U . S . direct . L 546,000 worth of silver was imported to 
En gh nd to Hongkong during the last five months of 1934, 
and ove r L 13,000,000 worth during t he year 1935 in additio 
to some ~~ 6 , 000 , 000 worth vmich went directly t ot he U. s . 
The Chinese Go' rernment mandate of November, 1 935, was 
immedi ate l y followed by greatly increased shipments of . 
silver from Hon P:kong . On Nov ember 9, the Cdlnnial Govern-
ment declared an embarg o on t he export of all fonn of 
white metal except by t he Colonial t rea surer or his agents. 
All of Hongkong 's curren cy of denominations less t han 5 
dollars had p reviovsly been silver , but the Government 
began the i Rsue of on e dollar notes , and 5 c ents and 10 
cents t okens to rep l a ce the white metal in circulation. 
On December 5, 1935, an act was pa.s sed by the Colonial 
Go ve rnment. By t his a c t , t he colony ,Nas to follow the 
action of the Chinese Government and abandon the silve r 
s tand a rd and t ake over full con t rol of the f oreign exchange 
market. Each note-issuing bank was required to surrender 
t o the Coloni a l rr r easurer, on demand , all silver co in and 
bullion held a gaj_nst note j_ssue; in exchang e o f which , the 
bank received a certifica t.e to the face value of the note 
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covered. The Exchange Fund, established under the 
con t rol of t he Tr easurer, regulated the exchange value 
of the Hongkong curr •'mcy. 
D. The I mmediate Ef f ect of Curren cy Reform 
Three mon ths working of China 's managed currency 
sho·wed it t o be a g r eat succ e ss. Va rious banks in Shanghai 
and elsewhere, t u r n ed in ten mil l ion doll ars worth of 
silver, in exchang e for whi ch legal tender no t es v1ent 
in t o circul ation throughout the coun t r y . Over $~62,000,000 
of n ew note s we re · issued i n November, 1 935 , a lone, and 
almost ~~5 8 ,000,000 in December. It cornmanded complete 
confidence. 
In view of their div ersifie d interes t s, the foreign 
bm'l:k s c ould n o t re a ch a common deci sion in regard t o 
surrendering t heir silver . In December, 1 935 , Dr. H . H . 
Kung, then Minis te r of Finance, being un able t o meet the 
request of these banks for speci a l c omp ensat i on based on 
the world price of s ilver, offered t o t he members of the 
Foreign Exchange Bankers ' Association the privileg e of 
ob taining the Central Banl< n o t es b;r turning over 60% in 
silver end LJ,O% in a cceptable se c u ri ti es-- this privileg e 
b eing sj_rnilar to thHt a v ai1abl e t o t he Chines e baril£. 
Such an arrangement, ·whi ch was offered for a period of 2 
yea::r s, would g ive free use for that time of legal t ender 
no tes equivalen t t o 2/3 of the legal value of the silver 
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deposi t ed. Subsequently, as an a l ternat ive , the bank s w·ere 
offered an a rran gement of mutual deposit s . (\'Vhere b v a 
ba.."'lk t urning i n i t s silver woul d s.t the same time make a 
d e p osit with the Central Ban k of China for a period of 2 
yeBrs in an amount equal t o 2/3 of the legal v alue of silve r, 
t urned ove r 8nd at the same time the Central Ban]{ would 
make a de nosi t of like amount ·with t he bank turning ove r 
t he silv er .) I t was fur the r p rovided that t h ere would be 
a difference in interes t r ates on the d e p osi t s in favor 
of t he banl<s turning ove r its silver . 
Beginning t he earl y part o f January j_n 1 936 , a ll forei r n 
b anks , with the exception of t he J apanese glf)Up, availed 
themselves one afte r the o ther of t his a rrangement for 
mutual deuosi t . The amount of silver turned in by the 
for e i gn ban k s in Shanghai amounted to app roximat ely ~~ 26 
mil lion . 
By the end of 1936 , the Nation a l Government held as 
r es erve not on l y hundred s of million dollars worth of 
s ilver, but als o similar reserves of forei gn excb ange 
as well. With this strong financ ial foundation , i t cou ld 
handl e i i·s sto c k of metal t o t he g r e a tes t p ossible 
adv antage in the vrorld market . F'ur t hermore, it cou ld 
work wi t h full c onfidenc e in t he adjus tment of its new 
nat ional currency t o the re qu i rement of China ' s e c onomy . 
R2 
For the fi rst tirhe in histor y , China h ad adopted 
a trul y monetary p ol i c y . This p olicy is in a ccorfunce 
with the trend of the e conomic world t oday . It brought 
Chi.na closer and mo re intimate t o the mo dern e conomi. c 
world. 
E . The National ization of Silve r 
On November 0 , 1 935 , the de c ree was is sued by t he 
Ministry of Fin ance-- effec t ive on the follo wing day--
announcing t he nevr changes in financial and currency 
polic:r , a imin g 8_t effective stabil ization of the National 
currenc y . The following was an official summary of t he 
Government's new financial p olicy : 1 
11 1) . Cornmenc :tng from November 4, 1935, · t he bank-notes 
issued by the thre e Governmen t bg_nk s shoul d be the s ole 
l egal tender. Paymen t of taxe s and discharg e of all public 
and p rivate obliga+-.ions shal l bee f f ec t ed by le gal t ender 
notes. No use of silver dol l ars or bullion for curr ency 
purpo ses is permi tted and any c on troversy of this provision 
is pu~ished by conf isc ation of t he whole amoun t of s ilve r 
se ized . Any individual found in illegal p ossession of 
silver shal l be punished in a ccordance with t:.he law 
governing a c ts of t reason against the na+-ion . 
1 Leang-Li T ' Bng , China ' s New Currency System, pp . 79-96 
83 
11 2). Banlmotes of issuing la nks o ther than those 
t hree Government b anks, which received p revious authorizat i n 
by the Ministry of Finance, shall remain in circulation, 
but t he tot a l outs tan din g banlmo tes of such bank sh all 
no t exc eed the amount in circul at ion on No v embe r 3 , 1935 . 
The outstanding banlmo tes of those banks shall be gradually 
re t ired an d e x changed for Cen t r a l Bank of Chin a banknotes 
wi t hin t he neriod t o be de t ermined by t he Ministr y of 
Pin Bnce. Al l r ese rve he l d agains t t he outs ta..11ding bankno te::: 
t o gethe r wi th uni ssued or re t ired notes of these banks, 
shall be handed over at once to t he currency reserve b o ard. 
No tes in n rocess of n rin t ing shal l a l s o be h an ded ove r t o 
the said Bo ard u p on -t-.ak:tn g deli very by the banks. 
11 3). A Currency Reserve Bo ard created by spec ial 
ordinance shall b e fo rmed t o contro l the i ssue and 
re t i remen t of l egal tender b ankno te s , and to ke e p in 
cus t ody the re serve aga:tns t outs tanding ban lmo t es. 
11 4 ). Commencing Novembe r 4 , b an k s , fi rms , and a ll 
private an d pu b l:tc i ns t:ttu t i ons and individuals holding 
s tand ard doll ar s, e i t her silver dollars , or silver bullion, 
shal l hand over t o t he Currency Rese rve Bo ard or its agen t s 
in exch~mge f or legal tender no te s, at f a ce v a lue in the 
c ase of si lver do :_l ars , and i n accordBnce wi t h t he net 
silve r con tent i n t he c ase of o ther si lve r bull ion or 
n on - standard dollar. 
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"5) All contra c t ual obligations in terms of silver 
shall be disch a r g ed by the p ayment of tender no te s in the 
nominal amount due . 
11 6) For t he purp o s e of k eepin p; the exchang e value 
of t he Chine s e dollar s table a t its present J.tvel, t he 
t hree Government b anks shs.ll buy and s ell foreign exchange 
in unlimited quantity . 11 
F . Currency Reserve Bo ard 
rrhe r e gulations governing the Currency Reserve Bo ard , 
\'Vhich wa s to be created under the special de c ree , 1Nere 
an n ounced by the Niinis t ry of F' i nance as fo llows : 1 
11 Article I--The Currency Reserve Board i s s p ecially 
creat ed by t he Minis t r y of Finance with a view t o cen t ra-
lizing its c ontrol ove r n o t e - i ssue and to consolida t e the 
credit of the n a tional curr en cy. 
" Arti cl e II--The Board shall be compo sed of the 
following members : 
1. Thra e represen tat i ves from the Ministry of 
Finance; 
2 . Two representatives from each of three 
Government bank s , t .he Cen t ral Bank of 
Chj_n a , t he Bank of China , and the Bank 
of Cow~unication ; 
3 . Two r e p resen ta tives of t he Ban k ers ' Association; 
l Leang- Li 'I' ' ang , Ch ina ' s New Curren cy Sys t em , pp 69 
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4. Two representatives of the Nat ive Bankers' 
Guild; -
5. Two from t he Chamber of Commerce; a.Dd 
6 . Five repre senta tives of t he v arious n o t e-
issuing ranks specia lly d esignated by the 
Minis t r y of F inance. 
"Article III--The Governor of t he Centra l Bank of Chin 
shall be concurrentl y t he Chairman of t he Board." 
r he Government-owned Central Bank was t o be 
reorganized as the Cen t r a l Reserve Ba.n l<~ of China, and v1a s 
ovm ed principally by banks and the general public, thus 
b e c oming an indep endent ins t itution, devoting itself 
chi efl y to maintaining t he stability of the Nation's 
curren cy . rr.he Central Reserve Ban){ of China held t he 
res erve s of the ba...'lking system and a c te d as deposi tory of 
all public f"Lmds; it also p rovide d cen t r a lized rediscount 
f acilitations for the o ther b anks. 'I'he Bankd did not 
under i~. ake gener a l col'J'l.rnerci a l business and after a p eriod 
of t wo y e ars , it wa s t o enjoy t he sole right of note-issue. 
Me e,su r es had also been prepared f or strengthErlng the 
c oiT'..me r ci a l banldng system and giving increased liquidity 
under sound conditions to the comm.ercial b anks so that they 
might have re s erved available to finance t he leg itimate 
requirements of trade and indus t ry. These measures would 
include the creation of a special ins t itution to deal 
exclusively wi th mor tgage busine ss Dnd s t eps would be taken 
t o amend t h e pres ent le ~al codes so as to imnrove the secur"ty 
of mort gage deeds. 
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FINDI NGS AND CONCLUS I ONS 
From t he b ee; irming of t he 20th Century u p t.o the 
pre sent Chi n a has been undergoin g a contin uous and 
revolu tionary che.nge in e c onomi ca, polici tal Bnd soci a l 
field s . 
Since money is i-he medium of exchang e , the standard 
of v a.lue , the store of value, t.h e meBns of deferred p aymeht 
t he monetary system is t he greatest de t.errrdnen t i n t he 
proper d e velopmen t o f n at ional e cono:m.ics. This is t rue 
espe c i a l ly in China were t he use of cred i t is of little 
impor·tance. 
It ·wa s. als o p o :tn ted out t ha t the undes irable and aged 
silver s t andard had c aused s erious d i s t urbences not onl y 
in c ommerce, i n t erna t iona.l trade , but a lso in f oreign 
d e bt s , i nternal price, pnd national income struc t ure. 
Since the l ast qu arter of t he y e ar 1 931 , t he ra t e 
of China ' s f ore ign exchange h2.d undergone a period of 
almo st unin t errupted advance, at first reflec tin g the 
depre c iation of t .he p rincipal currencies of the world, 
but l ater an d more alarmingl y , in response t o the 
artifici a l appre c iation of si lver price cuased by the 
.A .. rneri c 1:~.n Silver Purchase Act. Had the exch an g e ri sm. i n 
c on s equence of China 's f avorable balance of internationa l 
p apnen t s or of her purchase of silver abroad , i t v.rould 
represent mere l y t he adj u stment of China' s exchange t o a 
higher level. But when the adv~mce occured in the face 
of her unfav or 8.bJe bal ance , 2 .. s was the c as e in 1931, t he 
r isin g silver exchange ra t e entitled a renewed downwar-d 
a djustment of income and price struc ture . I t a lso 
r e sulted in the i.nabili ty of her excbange t o follow 
closely t he upvmrd movemen t of s:i. lver, tending to widen 
the p: e.p b e tween the theore ctice_l pal~ i t.y and the a ctual 
ra t es of e x chan g e and t o e ncourage t he export of silver 
Which added defl at ionary c onsequences . The artifid.al 
and e.brupt appreci e.tion of China ' s e x change was , therefore, 
frought wi t h seri ous in +~. ernational ~,nd domestic di sturbance • 
rfbe enormous exo dus o f silver t h at occured spe c:i. ally 
h e avily since t he summer mon t hs of 1934 , 2.11d t he resultant 
c ontinued depletion of the re serve s o f t he b ankin g sys t em, 
t ended on ·i~.he one h Bnd t o a ccelerat e the defl at ionary 
movement, and on the o therhB.nd t o t hre aten t he st ability 
of the financi a l struc t ure. 
China faced depres s ed a g l" i cul t ure , dis concordan t 
dovmward p rice movement , enormous outflow of silver and 
a depleted currency reserve . Many rne8.Sures which were 
·1·.8.k en by t he Government to improve t h e situation , thou gh 
p iece-meal 8nc1 ineff e c t ive at the time when t hey were 
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enfo rce d , bad the ultimate e ffec t of des t roying 1-.h e funda-
men tal a t t ribu t e o f the silver s t andard . 'l'he imposition 
of exp or t du ty and t he equil iza tion charg e in Oc t ober 
1934 , followed by t he embarg o of silve r exp or t and t he 
susp ension o f conver t ibility of no t es in t o s ilver marked 
c_ef i ni t ely a vir t ual abandonment of t he silver standard . 
ri'he Emerg ency Decree p rovided regulations making the 
no t es issued by t he three Government banks as the f ·ull 
legal t ender . I t also ge.ve definite rules 2, S t o the 
n ?_tionaliza.t ion of silve r , the centralization and control 
of n o t e - is sue en d its reserves in the hand s of t he Currency 
Reserve Bo ard , and the maintenan.ce of e x change stability . 
rl'hese measures , vuhich in i~.heir larg e a spec t s were in 
a ccord ance vri th monetary d e velopments abro a d , have eventual y 
broug1t China an inconvertibly managed st8ndard designed 
p rimarily to main t ain t he s t abili t y of forei gn exchange 
on t he basis of her ovvn reserves r a t her than t he stability 
of her internal prices . 
The currency reform was met with public support 
g re ater 7 .han it ·w ac~ firs t an t icipa i-ed. Except in Southern 
8.nd s ome Nor t hern p rovinces where p oli t ic a l c omplic a tion 
8nd some temporary s p ecula t.ive advances in prices had 
a dded diffi cul t ies , the monet.ary reform wa s carried t hrough 
with out undue disturban ces. 
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The mone t ary authori ty had been qui t e successful 
in 1r ain t a.ining t he rate of exchang e for six mon t hs ri ght 
8.f te r t he mone t-.2.r y re form wa s en.forced . 
Equallv si9.:nificant h a d been t he repercussions of 
- t .• ~.,.._.. • 
t he r e l Rtively low level of e x chsn g e u p on t he recovery 
of m:>ice an d t he reviva l of e x por t s . 
The re cove r y of p rices 2nd t h e improvemen t of t he 
in i~e rn ation al p o s i t ion were a ccompani e d by a s t e a dy return 
of easier money c onditions and a revival of financial 
a c t .ivities . 
A sound and effective man agemen t of curren cy dep end s 
for i t s success u pon the main t ena.n.ce of cer tain fund a-
men t2. l condi t i ons ·wh1ch h 2.v e . n ot yet f u l ly secured. It 
depends, in i-he f i rst p lac e , upon t he 2t tainmen t of a 
r e asonable de g ree of in t e r n a l B.n d ex t ern a l noli t ical 
s +-abili t y t o u phol d +·h e public c on f idence in +:he curr ency . 
There mus t be in tern a l pe ace s.nd order , e.n d free from 
internati onal c onflicts . I t require s, fur t hermore, a 
perfection of the financial mechanism and a centralization 
of financia l c on t rol. 'The central mon eta ry 8.uthority 
must be s t r on g an d inden endent enough t o resist the 
irresp on sible d emands of Govel"'nment borrowing s, c.,nd, at 
t he s ame t ime, po werful and COT:lp e t ent enough t o exercise 
the desired c on t rol ove r the money market throu gh t he 
discoun t p olicy or the open- marke t opera t ion s . Extensive 
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long- term foreign borrovving s must also b e enoours.g ed and 
n l e.nned t o min imize the strains on the bal 8_n c e of in ter-
nationB.l nayments and t o strengthen the resources in 
foreign currencies . 
Unfortunately the war with JapBn broke out on July 
7, 1 937 , which brought enorr10us Government deficit 
spend:Lng and r;reat los s on public revenue . 
rrhe presence of budgetary defici ts seem to make t he 
resort to infla t.i on at once e2.E:y an d irre si stable . 
"'he prerequis i ts to 8. policy of vmr finance free 
from t he ou tward effec t of infl at ion are t wo-- a supply 
of civilian goods c onsidered a dequate accordin~ t o current 
social standard, and t he Hdministrat i v e efficienc y in 
r 'evenue collection and in t he c ontrol of commodity dis-
t r ibution . I t is clear t hat these two ·prerequisi t. s have 
not existed in Chi n a . :.he ever- expanding war demand of 
the National Government could not be met nei t her by 
increasing productivity n or by volun te.ry or panned reducti o 
in civili an c onsumption . Infl!'l.tion renre sen ts a_ method of 
capital levy and f orce d saving; i t discourages voluntary 
sav :tng Vjhi l e stimulates specul a-t--ive a cthlity . 
Under the impac t of war , the characteristi c a l 
infla t ionary circu le- -currency , pri ce--could never be 
in t errupted ~md consequentl y led t o the stee.dy depreci ation 
of money in t erms of good s . 
91 
Thi s c atastrophic infl a t i on bas been surr ounling Chi na 
eve r s i nce 1936. The no t e-issut n g re a ch ed an unbelievable 
l e v e l in 1 949. Peo p le spent the money as soon a s t hey 
received it. The l a c k o f confidence i n money accen t u ated 
t he circulat ion speed and aggr ava t ed the curr ency 
d eureci ation. The infl e_t. ionarv spira l had been g oing 
on for seve r Etl y e2.rs u n til ·r,he p eop le refus e d t o a ccep t 
the leg al tende r no te s; economic t rEm.sac t ions then went 
b2.c k t o b a rte r s y stem. In order t o meet the se r ious si t ua-
t ion , t he Nat ion a l Government nullified t he :preva iling 
note s in 1948 an d is sue d t he 11 Gold Yu a n'' n o t es which soon 
devalued. 
'T'he re a re three ways to stop infl a tionary sp irB.l: 
(1) Nullific a tion--cancel t he old curr ency an d r ep l a ce 
i t with n ne w on e . Ge r many had s.dop ted t hi s me t hod af te r 
the F'irst War. (2 ) Dev alu ati on-- stop no te-issuing 
i w..medi ately in o rde r t o k eep mone t.e.ry v a l ue at i t s 
exi sting level. France u s ed t hi s me an s a f te r t he F irst 
Wo r ld War. (3 ) Defl a tion--con t r a ct vvi th Government ou t lay 
a cc omp an i e d by --gre.du a l · ·no t e withdrawin p: . This metho d is a 
r 8.t her p ainful a djustment.. It c ann ot b e e. c h ieved without 
hardship . Gr en t. Bri t i an s et the best example v.rhen she 
· adopted thi s defl a tion metho d in 1 922 . 
The p rere qui s i t e for t hes e t hree measu re s, more ove r, 
mu st t he be.l 8.nce of Gov e.rnment budg e t . The malajustment 
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on the part of the Government, and the successive internal 
and external conflicts creating devastation further weaken 
the e c onomic s trength of China . 'I'he National Government 
c ould neve r restore publi c confidence in its currency owing 
t o t he high officials' corruption and incompetence . 
Toward the end of 1 948 , the n ati on faced ul t ima..te bankruptc , • 
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ABSTRACT 
Amone-.; a ll the i mportant c otm t.ries of t he world, China 
unquestionably has the VIors t currency sys t em. Although 
reform had been agitated c ont inuously since 1900 , and 
several c a.reful l:;r prepared p Ja ns for reform had been vwrked 
out, nothine-.; had been nut into effec t until 1 935 . By 1935, 
China was forced t o abandon he r silver standard and a dopt 
the s tate- mru1aged paper currency which was 8. corr ect step 
t o ward improving the national e c onomy if i t was well 
mt:maged . 
A brief review of t.he recent cur r en cy history of that 
coun try wil l he l p one t. o understand t he present situation. 
Brass and copper C 8.Sh were prac t ic ally the only co i ns 
used extensively in China until dire c t t rade \'.·i th Western 
c oun +.ries be .a, an in the 16th cen t ury . F oreign hade brought 
in c aro lu s , ivlexicsn dollars, Ameri c8.n trade dollars , J apane e 
Yens , and dollars of several South Americsn countries . 
'I'hese dollars , t ogethe r with si lver bulJ ion in the form 
of shoes kno·wn as n Syc ee 11 , were the principal currency 
in the ports of China . 
Up until World War I, petty transactions among 
maj ori ty of the p opulace continued t o b e c arr ied in c a s h . 
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Although China h a d been on t he silver basis for a long 
t ime j _ t was no t un t il 1890 t hat Ch inese silver coins were 
min +-.e d in gre at quanti t y . r.rhe nat ive silver doll ars, 
VHr~ring sligh t l :r i n weigh t and fineness at t he different 
n~in ts, bad approxima +- ely t he s ame fine silver content as 
forei gn silve r dollars, and gene r ally circulated on a 
pB.ri ty wi t h them. 
'I'h e fr a c t i on a l silve r, lmov:n a s 11 small mon e y ", were 
.so on clep reci a t ed due t o e x cessive mintage by t he provincial 
au t ho r ities. Copper coins were issued by bo t h t he Central 
Government Bnd o t her provinci a l Governments; and, under 
the stimulus of t he larg e seigniorag e profi t s realized in 
t h eir coinage, were i s sued in excessive amoun t and likewise . 
vmn t t o a di scou:r:tt. 
Under t h e Manchur Emp i r e, and t he Re pub1ic a f t er 1911, 
a numbe r of pron o s als we re mad e for curr ency r e form; some 
for a unifo rm silver stand a rd, o t h ers, for a g old standard. 
'I'h e on 1y c oncre t e accompli shmen t ·was the p assage · of t he 
coina p: e law of 1 914. 'l 'his l aw c ame ne a r e r t o giving China 
a nat ional cur rency s y s t em t han anyth i n g t h a t had g one 
befor e . 'f he 6hinese doll ar s i ssued u n de r t he l aw of 1914 
had been widely circul a t ed. Bu t floods of p aper money a nd 
e x cessive issues of f ractional s ilve r coins by t he p r ovinci a l 
mints had k ept t he new dol l ar s from extendi n g over all of 
China. n 1e frac t i onal silve r coins soon bec ame as d e p reci a t 1ed 
a s t he old 11 small money n. I 
After t he revolution of 1911, p rovinci a l and military 
Governmen t s and banks which generally acting under the 
orde rs of the p roviri.cial Governments, flooded the count ry 
with paper money . 
The ntael 11 had already d is appeared f'rom most par t s of 
the c ount r y . By t he end of t he 19th cen t ury, survival o f 
this archai c standard o f value was dependent upon official 
and other artifici a l support. The foreign dominated 
Imperial Ufa.r i t ime Customs continued to use the Haikwan tael 
which i t ha.d created . Manchur Reg ime c a.rr ied on wi th the 
Ku-Ping tael which was t he off ici a l currenc y of the 
Imperial Bo ard of Re v enue. Al l monetary dues t o the 
Government except cu stom coll e c tions had to be paid in 
this official currency. Fore i gn and other banks a t 
Shanghai were responsible for main tainin r~ the Shanghai 
tael, th e conversion of whi ch i n t o dollars yielded regular 
profi ts to bs.nkers . These three principal taels differed 
cons iderabl y in value s.mong themselv es . 
~L'he fs.ll of the IVlanchur Empire broup;ht an end to the 
Ku- Ping tae l. 'l'he Republic Government establi shed the 
doll ar as its official currency . By 1 930 , taels survived 
only as the fictitious currency of the Maritime Cus toms, 
except in Shanghai. I t vms on l y i n Shanghai that the 
influence of private bankers was suffi c ient to maintain 
the tael as a v:ri despre ad stand8.rd. 
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~-:'he first step towB.rd fi nal e l imina t ion of this 
archaic t ae l unit by t he Na tional Government was t he 
official aboli t on of t he Haikwa.."1 tael. In Febru a ry, 
1 930 , tl., i s step was announced, and was firs t c arried 
ou ~ wi t h r egard t o Ch inese i mpor ts . The cus t om tae l was 
bein g replaced by t he newl y established C1..1S:;om Gol d Uni t . 
In April , 19 33, -the comple te abolition of a ll forms of tael 
vvas de c reed by the Gove rnment . 
Mi nting of t he new standard national doll a r began on 
March 1 , 1 93 3 , a t Shanghai Mint. This stmdard dollar 
vJas 88 /100 fine , we i ghed 26.697 gra:rm11es g ro ss . 
J.~ arly banlmotes represented copper . r he fiat money 
issue d by t he Manchur Reg ime in t he 1 9th included some 
no t es representing silver and o t her rep resenting copp er. 
By 1920 , hov1e ver, bankno te s had be en issued more and more 
again st silve r. 
Bes ide t he cur rency issued by Chinese banking and 
me r c ant i l e ins t i t u t .ions , 8. number of forei gn banks in 
Ch in e. 8.l s o is s ue d b8nJmotes , 2~11 b a sed u p on t he silve r 
doll a r. 
GoJ. d , thou gh s c a rce in China , has occasi onally been 
used a s curre ncy i n ·rhe country. Under t he Republic, some 
at:.t .empts iNe re made t o es tab l ish a gold c oina.ge; but the 
coines minted j_n Tientsin and el s ewhere disappear ed when the 
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metal v a lue increased right afte r the First War . The 
Nat ional Government in t he 1 930 's defini t ely established 
a g ol d unit for payment of impor t duties; but t he re is no 
gold coin in circulation, and the uni t was being represente , 
by paper n o t es. The gold wa s sup p osed t o conta in 60 .1866 
cen t i grffiYlme s of fine gold, equal to 40 U. S . gold cen t s. 
1'he e stablishment of t he Central Bank of China in 1928 
was t he beginning of real Government con t rol over banking 
and currency in the coun tJ>'T . In 1928, t he Bank of China 
wa s made a semi- gov ernmental concern, s o did t he B~:mk of 
Communic at ions. 
Since 1 931, China h ad been gone through a period of 
defla t ion crisis, brought partly by the inherent difficulti s 
. of the s j_l v e r s tandard and p artl y by the i mpact of the 
force of world economic dep res s ion. The position of 
silver had undergone a fund amental chang e in 1 935. The 
i nel astici ty of j_ t s p roduc tion c ou p led with the ins tability 
of i t s demmd r esu1 ted in the f re quent and irregular 
flue t u 2_ti on of its p rice. Under such c ondi tion, t he unique 
a dherence t o t he silver s tandard in a world of gold and 
paper standar d h as v ery ser ious consequences. It is 
charac teri zed in part i cular by the frequenc y and t he 
magn i tude of exchan g e fluctuation , l eading t o c onstant 
r ead justment of in t Einal price and incomn s true t ure. Wh.en 
the pressure i s exe r ted from withou t , t h e p rocess of 
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ad justment i s made espe c ially diff i cult owing t o t he 
e.bsence of r ec i n roc a l effec t s of the special forms on 
the nri c e mo vement and the p r ice movement on trade trend . 
Moreov er, t h e viol e n t. 'fluctuati on in the r ate of exchan g e 
and t he a cc o111panving . exchange risk tend t o make imp ossible 
t he inflow of short- term credit t o meet a t emp orary de f i cit 
in the in tern ation a l bal ance. The silver s t and a r d , there-
fore , falls f ar short of the basic requi r emen t of a sound 
monetary standard. 
The deflationary c r isis of the years 1 931 t o 1 935 
r epres ented a pai nful adj u stment of China's domestic 
e con omy t o the artificial appreciation of silver exchange. 
The serious consequences of the fall of ap,ri cul tural p rice, 
V'.rh i ch s tarted in 1 830 and whi ch was j_ntensified b y the 
ar tificial ap nreciation of silve r exchange , led to an 
ou t flow of funds from interior t o t he coastal ci ties . 
Since the end o f 1 931, t he rate of f oreign exchange 
had unde r gone a period of advance , at f irs t reflec tin g 
t he d e p recia ti on of the principal currency of the world 
bu t later effected by Ameri c an silve r purcha sing policy . 
The adv ance o c cured in the face of unfavorable balance; it 
en t i t l ed a renewed d ovmwa.rd ad jus tmen t o f income and price 
s t ruc t ure. On t he other h2.nd , it resul t ed in an instabili t 
of Chin ese exchange to fo llow clo se l y t he upward movement 
of silver, t ending t o widen t he g2-p b etween the t heore t ical 
=========!~==========================--=-~========================= 
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parity and the actual rate of exchang e and to encourage the 
export of silver with added deflationarv c ons equences. It 
is indis nutable tha t the Americ an silver purchasing , c oming 
at a time when the force of deflation had a lready been well 
under way , t end to make the sj_ tuation parti cularly panicky 
and serious , thereby intensifying t he forces of depression. 
'The external drain of s ilver, the decline of the internal 
p rice which would have occured under the influence of ·world 
depres s ion wa s a cc elerated . 
In dealing with the ou t flow of si lver , some measures 
·were taken by the Government: t he i mposi ti on of export 
du t .y and t he equilization chsnge in Oc t ober of 1934, t he 
restriction of silver free movement coastwise and within 
Ch ina , the embargo of silver export. Desni t e the p r olonged 
and painful effe c t +- o remain on it , t he currency reform of 
19~5 was merely an official legal a c knowledgemen t of ~he 
ac t u a l situation . 
Currency reform brought the exchange instability t o 
an end . The cen t ralizat.ion of res e rve, the con trol of 
note-is sue, all help ed to unify the currency sys t em. Since 
the new currency was linke d t o pound S t erling and Amer ic an 
dollars , it can be called forei gn exchange sta.n.dard. 
The sts.bili t y of t he exchange had been well main tained 
f rom 1935 to 1 937 . 'l'he stability of e xchange, when 
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contrac ted with the violent fluctuations in the mon t hs 
preceding t he reform, he l ped i·.owa.rd restoring t he con-
fidence of t he public ~md the maintenance of financial 
s.tabi}. i ty were a ccompanied by a steady return of easie r 
money c ond i t ion s . Funds which had previou s l y used in 
exchBnge speculation were diverted into the financing 
of business re covery . 
A soun d and effectiv e menagement of currency dep end 
its success u pon t he main t enance of cer t-a in fu_ndament a l 
co!lditi.ons: First , the attainment of a reas onable degre e 
of inter nal and external poli tical stability t o uphold 
the public confidence in t he currency . Second, t he 
perfection of the financi a l me chanism and the cen trali zati o 
of finan ci a l con ~ :.rol . 'I'he cen tral mane t ary authority 
mus t be strong and indep endent enough t o resi s t; the 
irresponsible demand of Government borrowing an d at t he 
same time , it must be p owerful and competent enough t o 
exercise the desired control over the monetary market 
through the d1scount p olicy or the open market operation . 
Extensive long- te rm fo ;· eign b orrowing must a l s o be 
encourag ed and p l anned to minimi 7,e 1-he s t r a ins ln the 
in t erna t ional naj~ents and to streng t hen the resourc es 
in forei gn curr encies . 
Unfor t.unHte l y t he war with Jap an broke out in the 
summer of l £j 37. The financi a l policy of the National 
Government under war condi t ion s had b een worke d by 
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unprecedent outl ay in excess of revenue from taxa t ion and 
saving with the re sult of exp ansion in no t e-issue and 
infl a tionary p ressure u p on prices . 'l:'he inflat i onary 
circle of price and currency led to the s t e a dy dep reciation 
of rr,on ey in t.erms of goods . I t caused hardship to the 
fixed income g roup; it encouraged s p e cul ation , commodity 
hoarding ; and it disrup t ed the entire economic system. 
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